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In approaches to quantum theory in which the quantum state is regarded as a representation
of knowledge, information, or belief, two agents can assign different states to the same quantum
system. This raises two questions: when are such state assignments compatible? and how should
the state assignments of different agents be reconciled? In this paper, we address these questions
from the perspective of the recently developed conditional states formalism for quantum theory
[1]. Specifically, we derive a compatibility criterion proposed by Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin
from the requirement that, upon acquiring data, agents should update their states using a quantum
generalization of Bayesian conditioning. We provide two alternative arguments for this criterion,
based on the objective and subjective Bayesian interpretations of probability theory. We then apply
the same methodology to the problem of quantum state improvement, i.e. how to update your state
when you learn someone else’s state assignment, and to quantum state pooling, i.e. how to combine
the state assignments of several agents into a single assignment that accurately represents the views
of the group. In particular, we derive a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and Wiseman
under much weaker assumptions than those made in the original derivation. All of our results apply
to a much broader class of experimental scenarios than have been considered previously in this
context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bayesian probability theory, probabilities represent
an agent’s information, knowledge or beliefs; and hence
it is possible for two agents to assign different probability
distributions to one and the same quantity. Recently, due
in part to the emergence of quantum information theory,
there has been a resurgence of interest in approaches to
quantum theory that view the quantum state in a simi-
lar way [2–13], and in such approaches it is possible for
two agents[56] to assign different quantum states to one
and the same quantum system (henceforth, to avoid rep-
etition, the term “state” will be used to refer to either
a classical probability distribution or a quantum state).
One way this can arise is when the agents have access
to differing data about the system. For example, in the
BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [14], Alice, hav-
ing prepared the system herself, would assign one of four
pure states to the system, whereas the best that Bob can
do before making his measurement is to assign a maxi-
mally mixed state to the system. This naturally leads to
the question of when two state assignments are compati-
ble with one another, i.e. when can they represent validly
differing views on one and the same system?
The meaning of “validly differing view” depends on the
interpretation of quantum theory and, in particular, on
the status of the quantum state within it. If the quan-
tum state is thought of as being analogous to a Bayesian
probability distribution, then the meaning of “validly dif-
fering view” also depends on precisely which approach to
Bayesian probability one is trying to apply to the quan-
tum case. In the Jaynes-Cox approach [15, 16], some-
times called objective Bayesianism, states are taken to
represent objective information or knowledge and, given
a particular collection of known data, there is assumed
to be a unique state that a rational agent ought to as-
sign, often derived from a rule such as the Jaynes max-
imum entropy principle. In contrast, in the de Finetti-
Ramsey-Savage approach [17–21], often called subjective
Bayesianism, states are taken to represent an agent’s sub-
jective degrees of belief and agents may validly assign dif-
ferent states to the same system even if they have access
to identical data about the system. This is due to differ-
ing prior state assignments, the roots of which are taken
to be unanalyzable by the subjective Bayesian.
In its modern form, the problem of quantum state com-
patibility was first tackled by Brun, Finkelstein and Mer-
min (BFM) [22–25], although this work was motivated
by earlier concerns of Peierls [26, 27]. BFM provide a
compatibility criterion for quantum states on finite di-
mensional Hilbert spaces. Mathematically, the criterion
is that two density operators are compatible if the inter-
section of their supports is nontrivial. In particular, the
BFM criterion implies that two distinct pure states are
never compatible, so that if any agent assigns a pure state
to the system then any other agent who wishes to assign
a compatible pure state must assign the same one. In
the special case of commuting state assignments, it also
implies the classical criterion for compatibility of proba-
bility distributions on finite sample spaces, which is that
there must be at least one element of the sample space
that is in the support of both distributions.
To date there have been two types of argument given
for requiring the BFM compatibility criterion: one due to
BFM themselves [24] (an argument that takes a similar
point of view was later developed by Jacobs [28]) and one
due to Caves, Fuchs and Schack (CFS) [29]. Although
not explicitly given in Bayesian terms, the BFM argu-
ment has an objective Bayesian flavor in that it assumes
that there is a unique quantum state that all agents
would assign to the system if they had access to all the
available data. On the other hand, the CFS argument is
an attempt to give an explicitly subjective Bayesian ar-
gument for the BFM compatibility criterion. Both argu-
ments start from lists of intuitively plausible criteria that
state assignments should obey, but, in our view, a more
rigorous approach is needed in order to correctly gener-
alize the meaning that compatibility has in the classical
case.
Classically, there are two arguments for compatibility
depending on whether one adopts the objective or the
subjective approach. In both cases, compatibility is de-
fined in terms of the rules that Bayesian probability the-
ory lays down for making probabilistic inferences, and,
in particular the requirement that, upon learning new
data, states should be updated by Bayesian condition-
ing. The reason for demanding an argument based on a
well-defined methodology for inference is that there are
situations in which even a Bayesian would want to up-
date their state assignment by means other than Bayesian
conditioning. For example, if you discover some informa-
tion that is better represented as a constraint than as the
acquisition of new data, such as finding out the mean en-
ergy of the molecules in a gas, then minimization of rel-
ative entropy, rather than Bayesian conditioning, would
commonly be used to update probabilities [30, 31]. Argu-
ments have also been made for applying generalizations of
Bayesian conditioning, e.g. Jeffrey conditioning [32, 33],
on the acquisition of new data in certain circumstances.
It is not clear whether the intuitions used by BFM and
CFS are applicable to all such circumstances and indeed
our intuitions about probabilities and quantum states are
not all that reliable in general. It is therefore important
to be clear about the type of inference procedures that
are being allowed for in any argument for a compatibility
condition.
What is missing from the existing arguments for BFM
compatibility is a specification of precisely what sorts
of probabilistic inferences are valid — in short, a pre-
cise quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning. We have
recently proposed such an analog within the formalism
3of conditional quantum states [1]. This formalism has
the advantage of being more causally neutral than the
standard quantum formalism, by which we mean that
Bayesian conditioning is applied in the same way regard-
less of how the data is causally related to the system
of interest, e.g. the data could be the outcome of a di-
rect measurement of the system, a variable involved in
the preparation of the system, the outcome of a mea-
surement of a remote system that is correlated with the
system of interest, etc. This causal neutrality allows us to
develop arguments that are applicable in a broader range
of experimental scenarios — or more accurately, causal
scenarios — than those obtained within the conventional
formalism.
In this article, we derive BFM compatibility from the
principled application of the idea that, upon learning new
data, agents should update their states according to our
quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. This leaves
no room for other principles of a more ad hoc nature.
Both objective and subjective Bayesian arguments are
given by first reviewing the corresponding classical com-
patibility arguments and then drawing out the parallels
to the quantum case using conditional states. The BFM-
Jacobs and CFS arguments are then criticized in the light
of our results.
Having dealt with the question of how state assign-
ments can differ, we then turn to the question of how
to combine the state assignments of different agents. In
Bayesian theory, the purpose of states is to provide a
guide to rational decision making via the principle of
maximizing expected utility. In its usual interpretation,
this is a rule for individual decision making that does not
take into account the views of other agents. This raises
two conceptually distinct problems.
Firstly, decision making should be performed on the
basis of all available relevant evidence. The fact that an-
other agent assigns a particular state could be relevant
evidence, and may cause you to change your state as-
signment, even in the case where both state assignments
are the same. For example, if both you and I assign the
same high probability to some event, then telling you my
state assignment may cause you to assign an even higher
probability if you believe that my reasons for assigning
a high probability are valid and that they are indepen-
dent of yours. Following Herbut [34], we call updating
your state assignment in light of another agent’s state
assignment state improvement.
Secondly, if two agents do have different state assign-
ments, then they may have different preferences over the
available choices in decision making scenarios. In prac-
tice, decisions often have to be made as a group, in which
case a preference conflict prevents all the agents in the
group from maximizing their individual expected utili-
ties simultaneously. This motivates the need for meth-
ods of combining state assignments into a single assign-
ment that accurately represents the beliefs, information,
or knowledge of the group as a whole. This problem is
called state pooling.
In the classical case, both improvement and pooling
have been studied extensively (see [35] and [36] for re-
views). From this it is clear that there is no hope of com-
ing up with a universal rule, applicable to all cases, that
is just a simple functional of the different state assign-
ments. Instead, we offer a general methodology for com-
bining states, in both the classical and quantum cases,
again based on the application of Bayesian conditioning.
Learning another agent’s state assignment can be
thought of as acquiring new data. Therefore, given
our Bayesian methodology, the state improvement prob-
lem is solved by simply conditioning on this data. For
state pooling, we adopt the supra-Bayesian approach
[37], which requires the agents to put themselves in the
shoes of a neutral decision maker. Although their abil-
ity to do this is not guaranteed, doing so reduces the
pooling problem to an instance of state improvement,
i.e. the neutral decision maker’s state is conditioned on
all the other agents’ state assignments and the result is
used as the pooled state. As with compatibility, our ap-
proach to these problems is to draw out the parallels to
the classical case using conditional states and to derive
our results by a principled application of Bayesian condi-
tioning. This is an improvement over earlier approaches
[10, 25, 28, 34, 38, 39], which use more ad hoc principles.
However, some of the results of these earlier approaches
are recovered within the present approach. In particu-
lar, a pooling rule previously proposed by Spekkens and
Wiseman [10] can be derived from our method in the spe-
cial case where the minimal sufficient statistics for the
data collected by different agents satisfy a condition that
is slightly weaker than conditional independence. This
is an improvement on the original derivation, which only
holds for a more restricted class of scenarios.
The results in this paper can be viewed as a demon-
stration of the conceptual power of the conditional states
formalism developed in [1]. However, two concepts that
were not discussed in [1] are required to develop our ap-
proach to the state improvement and pooling problems.
These are quantum conditional independence and suffi-
cient statistics. Conditional independence has previously
been studied in [40], from which we borrow the required
results. Several definitions of quantum sufficient statis-
tics have been given in the literature [41–43], but they
concern sufficient statistics for a quantum system with
respect to a classical parameter, or sufficient statistics
for measurement data with respect to a preparation vari-
able. By contrast, here we need sufficient statistics for
classical variables with respect to quantum systems. Our
treatment of this is novel to the best of our knowledge.
4II. REVIEW OF THE CONDITIONAL STATES
FORMALISM
A. Basic concepts
The conditional states formalism, developed in [1],
treats quantum theory as a generalization of the classical
theory of Bayesian inference. In the quantum generaliza-
tion, classical variables become quantum systems, and
normalized probability distributions over those variables
become operators on the Hilbert spaces of the systems
that have unit trace but are not always positive. The
generalization is summarized in table I, the elements of
which we now review. The treatment here is necessarily
brief. A more detailed development of the formalism and
its relation to the conventional quantum formalism can
be found in [1].
Note that we adopt the convention that classical vari-
ables are denoted by letters towards the end of the alpha-
bet, such as R,S, T,X, Y and Z, while quantum systems
are denoted by letters near the beginning of the alphabet,
such as A,B and C.
In the classical theory of Bayesian inference, a joint
probability distribution P (R,S) describes an agent’s
knowledge, information or degrees of belief about a pair
of random variables R and S. There is no constraint on
the interpretation of what the two variables can repre-
sent. They may refer to the properties of two distinct
physical systems at a single time, or to the properties of
a single system at two distinct times, or indeed to any
pair of physical degrees of freedom located anywhere in
spacetime. They may even have a completely abstract
interpretation that is independent of physics, e.g. R
could represent acceptance or rejection of the axioms of
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and S could be the truth
value of the Reimann hypothesis. However, given that
we are interested in quantum theory, such abstract inter-
pretations are of less interest to us than physical ones.
The main point is that the same mathematical object, a
joint probability distribution P (R,S), is used regardless
of the interpretation of the variables in terms of physical
degrees of freedom.
The theory of quantum Bayesian inference aims to
achieve a similar level of independence from physical in-
terpretation. In particular, we want to describe infer-
ences about two systems at a fixed time via the same
rules that are used to describe a single system at two
times. As such, the usual talk of “systems” in quantum
theory is inappropriate, as a system is usually thought
of as something that persists in time. Instead, the basic
element of the conditional states formalism is a region.
An elementary region describes what would normally be
called a system at a fixed point in time and a region is
a collection of elementary regions. For example, whilst
the input and output of a quantum channel are usually
thought of as the same system in the conventional for-
malism, they correspond to two disjoint regions in our
terminology. This gives a greater symmetry to the case
of two systems at a single time, which also correspond to
two disjoint regions.
A region A is assigned a Hilbert space HA and a com-
posite region AB consisting of two disjoint regions, A
and B, is assigned the Hilbert space HAB = HA ⊗ HB.
The knowledge, information, or beliefs of an agent about
AB are described by a linear operator on HAB (this op-
erator has other mathematical properties which will be
discussed further on). This operator is called the joint
state and, for the moment, we denote it by τAB. Ideally,
one would like this framework to handle any set of re-
gions, regardless of where they are situated in spacetime,
but unfortunately the formalism developed in [1] is not
quite up to the task. For instance, it is currently unclear
how to represent degrees of belief about three regions
that describe a system at three distinct times.
In a classical theory of Bayesian inference, one also
has the freedom to conditionalize upon any set of vari-
ables, regardless of the spatio-temporal relations that
hold among them, or indeed of the spatio-temporal re-
lations between the conditioning variables and the con-
ditioned variables. Therefore, this is an ideal to which a
quantum theory of Bayesian inference should also strive.
Again, the formalism of [1] does not quite achieve this
ideal. For instance, this framework cannot currently deal
with pre- and post-selection, for which the conditioning
regions straddle the conditioned system in time.
Whilst these sorts of consideration limit the scope of
our results, we are still able to treat a wide variety of
causal scenarios including all those that have been pre-
viously discussed in the literature on compatibility, im-
provement, and pooling. We begin by providing a synop-
sis of the formalism as it has been developed thus far[57].
Table I summarizes the basic concepts and formulas of
this framework and defines the terminology that we use
for them.
For an elementary regionA, the quantum analogue of a
normalized probability distribution is a trace-one opera-
tor τA onHA. For a region AB, composed of two disjoint
elementary regions, the analogue of a joint distribution
P (R,S) is an operator τAB on HAB. The marginaliza-
tion operation P (S) =
∑
R P (R,S) which corresponds
to ignoring R, is replaced by the partial trace operation,
τB = TrA (τAB), which corresponds to ignoring A. The
role of the marginal distribution P (S) is played by the
marginal state τB .
If A is an elementary region, then τA is also positive,
and simply corresponds to a conventional density opera-
tor on A. To highlight this fact, we denote it by ρA in
this case. The positivity of marginal states on elemen-
tary regions implies that the joint state τAB of a pair of
elementary regions must have positive partial traces (but
it need not itself be a positive operator).
Another key concept in classical probability is a con-
ditional probability distribution P (S|R). P (S|R) repre-
sents an agent’s degrees of belief about S for each pos-
sible value of R. It satisfies
∑
s P (S = s|R = r) =
1 for all r and is related to the joint probability by
5Classical Quantum
State P (R) τA
Joint state P (R,S) τAB
Marginalization P (S) =
∑
R
P (R,S) τB = TrA (τAB)
Conditional state P (S|R) τB|A
∑
S
P (S|R) = 1 TrB
(
τB|A
)
= IA
Relation between joint and P (R,S) = P (S|R)P (R) τAB = τB|A ⋆ τA
conditional states P (S|R) = P (R,S)/P (R) τB|A = τAB ⋆ τ
−1
A
Bayes’ theorem P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S) τA|B = τB|A ⋆ (τAτ
−1
B )
Belief propagation P (S) =
∑
R
P (S|R)P (R) τB = TrA
(
τB|AτA
)
TABLE I: Analogies between the classical theory of Bayesian inference and the conditional states formalism for quantum theory.
P (S|R) = P (R,S)/P (R). This implies Bayes’ theorem,
P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S), which allows condition-
als to be inverted. Conditional probabilities are critical
to probabilistic inference. In particular, if you assign
the conditional distribution P (S|R) and your state for
R is P (R), then your state for S can be computed from
P (S) =
∑
R P (S|R)P (R). This map from P (R) to P (S)
is called belief propagation.
The quantum analogue of a conditional probability is
a conditional state for region B given region A. This
is a linear operator on HAB, denoted τB|A, that satisfies
TrB
(
τB|A
)
= IA. It is related to the joint state by τB|A =
τAB ⋆ τ
−1
A , where the ⋆-product is defined by
M ⋆N ≡ N1/2MN1/2, (1)
and we have adopted the convention of dropping identity
operators and tensor products, so that τAB ⋆τ
−1
A is short-
hand for τAB ⋆(τ
−1
A ⊗IB) = (τ
−1/2
A ⊗IB)τAB(τ
−1/2
A ⊗IB).
The quantum analogue of Bayes’ theorem, relating τB|A
and τA|B, is τA|B = τB|A ⋆ (τAτ
−1
B ). Conditional states
are the key to inference in this framework. In partic-
ular, if you assign the conditional state τB|A and your
state for A is τA, then your state for B can be computed
from τB = TrA
(
τB|AτA
)
, where we have used the cyclic
property of the trace. This map from τA to τB is called
quantum belief propagation.
B. The relevance of causal relations
The rules of classical Bayesian inference are indepen-
dent of the causal relationships between the variables un-
der consideration. For instance, the formula for belief
propagation from R to S does not depend on whether
R and S represent properties of distinct systems or of
the same system at two different times. Nonetheless,
causal relations between variables can affect the set of
probability distributions that are regarded as plausible
models. For example, if T is a common cause of R and
S, then R and S should be conditionally independent
given T , i.e. any viable probability model should satisfy
P (R,S|T ) = P (R|T )P (S|T ).
In the quantum case, the situation is similar. The rules
of inference, such as the formula for belief propagation,
do not depend on the causal relations between the regions
under consideration, but causal relations do affect the set
of operators that can describe joint states. Indeed, the
dependence is stronger in the quantum case because the
kind of operator used depends on the causal relation even
for a pair of regions.
Suppose that A and B represent elementary regions.
A and B are causally related if there is a direct causal
influence from A to B (for instance, if A and B are the
input and the output of a quantum channel), or if there
is an indirect causal influence through other regions (for
instance, there is a sequence of channels with A as the
input to the first and B as the output of the last). A
and B are acausally related if there is no such direct or
indirect causal connection between them, for instance, if
they represent two distinct systems at a fixed time.
If A and B are acausally related, then their joint state
τAB is a positive operator. It simply corresponds to a
standard density operator for independent systems. The
conditionals τA|B and τB|A are then also positive opera-
tors. Given that ρ is the standard notation for density
operators, a joint state of two acausally related regions
is denoted ρAB. Similarly, the conditional states are de-
noted ρA|B and ρB|A. This notation is meant to be a
reminder of the mathematical properties of these opera-
tors. We refer to them as acausal (joint and conditional)
states.
If A and B are causally related, then τAB does not
have to be a positive operator, but τTAAB (or equivalently
6τTBAB) is always positive, where
TA and TB denote partial
transpose operations on A and B[58]. Similarly, τA|B and
τB|A are not necessarily positive, but they must have
positive partial transpose. In this case, the operators
τAB, τA|B and τB|A are denoted ̺AB, ̺A|B and ̺B|A re-
spectively and we refer to them as causal (joint and con-
ditional) states. In particular, dynamical evolution tak-
ing ρA to ρB can be represented as quantum belief prop-
agation using a causal conditional state ̺B|A, i.e. ρB =
TrA
(
̺B|AρA
)
. If, in the conventional formalism, the
dynamics would be described by a Completely Positive
Trace-preserving (CPT) map EB|A : L (HA) → L (HB),
then the corresponding conditional state ̺B|A is the op-
erator on HA⊗HB that is Jamio lkowski-isomorphic [44]
to EB|A, that is, ̺B|A =
∑
j,k |j〉 〈k|A ⊗ EB|A′ (|k〉 〈j|A′),
whereHA′ is isomorphic toHA and {|j〉} is any orthonor-
mal basis for HA.
C. Modeling classical variables
Joint, marginal and conditional classical probability
distributions are special cases of joint, marginal and con-
ditional quantum states. To see this, note that a ran-
dom variable R, with dR possible values, can be asso-
ciated with a dR dimensional Hilbert space with a pre-
ferred basis {|r1〉R , |r2〉R , . . . , |rdR〉R} labeled by the pos-
sible values of R. Then, a probability distribution P (R)
can be encoded in a density operator that is diagonal
in this basis via τR =
∑
r P (R = r) |r〉 〈r|R. Simi-
larly, for two random variables, R and S, we can con-
struct Hilbert spaces and preferred bases for each and
encode a joint distribution P (R,S) in a joint state via
τRS =
∑
r,s P (R = r, S = s) |r〉 〈r|R⊗|s〉 〈s|S , and a con-
ditional distribution P (S|R) in a conditional state via
τS|R =
∑
r,s P (S = s|R = r) |r〉 〈r|R ⊗ |s〉 〈s|S .
Because all operators on a given classical region com-
mute, the ⋆-product reduces to the regular operator
product for classical states, so that the formulas for
quantum Bayesian inference reduce to their classical
counterparts. For instance, the quantum Bayes’ theo-
rem becomes τR|S = τS|RτRτ
−1
S , which is equivalent to
P (R|S) = P (S|R)P (R)/P (S).
Note that if we adopt the convention that partial trans-
poses on classical regions are always defined with respect
to the preferred basis, then classical joint and conditional
states are invariant under this operation. Therefore, clas-
sical causal states have the same mathematical proper-
ties as classical acausal states.[59]. Since the notational
distinction between ρ and ̺ is supposed to act as a re-
minder of the mathematical difference between causal
and acausal states for pairs of quantum regions, there
is no need to make the distinction for classical states.
We therefore adopt the convention of denoting classical
states over an arbitrary set of regions by ρ, regardless of
how the regions are causally related.
To complete our discussion of the basic objects in the
conditional states formalism, we need to describe how
correlations between classical and quantum regions can
be represented. The classical variable X is represented
by a Hilbert space HX with a preferred basis, as de-
scribed above, and the quantum region A is associated
with a Hilbert space HA with no preferred structure.
The hybrid region XA is assigned the Hilbert space
HXA = HX ⊗ HA, but in representing correlated states
on this space, we must ensure that the classical part
remains classical. In particular, this means that there
can be no entanglement between X and A, and that
the reduced state on X must be diagonal in the pre-
ferred basis. This motivates defining a hybrid quantum-
classical operator on HXA to be an operator of the form
MXA =
∑
x |x〉 〈x|X ⊗MX=x,A, where each MX=x,A is
an operator on HA. The operators MX=x,A are called
the components of MXA.
It follows that a hybrid joint state has the form τXA =∑
x |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ τX=x,A, where each component τX=x,A is
an operator on HA. Recall that if X and A are acausally
related, then τXA must be positive, while if X and A are
causally related, then τTAXA must be positive. However,
given the form of a hybrid state, τXA is positive if and
only if τTAXA is positive, so the two conditions are equiva-
lent. Consequently, causal and acausal states on hybrid
regions correspond to the same set of operators. There-
fore, as for classical states, ρ is used to denote all hybrid
states, regardless of their causal interpretation.
By calculating the marginal state ρX and ρA from the
hybrid state ρAX , we can define conditional states as
ρX|A = ρAX ⋆ ρ
−1
A and ρA|X = ρAX ⋆ ρ
−1
X = ρAXρ
−1
X .
In the latter case, the ⋆-product reduces to the regu-
lar operator product because X is classical. There are
two sorts of conditional states for hybrid systems cor-
responding to whether the quantum or the classical re-
gion is on the right of the conditional. If the condition-
ing system is quantum, then the conditional state has
the form ρX|A =
∑
x |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρX=x|A where ρX=x|A
is positive and
∑
x ρX=x|A = IA. It follows that the
set of operators {ρX=x|A} is a Positive Operator Valued
Measure (POVM) and therefore such conditional states
can be used to represent measurements, a fact that we
shall make use of in §III A. If the conditioning sys-
tem is classical, then the conditional state has the form
ρA|X =
∑
x ρA|X=x ⊗ |x〉 〈x|X where ρA|X=x is positive
and TrA
(
ρA|X=x
)
= 1 for all x. The operators {ρA|X=x}
therefore constitute a set of normalized states on A, and
can therefore be used to represent state preparations, a
fact that will also be used in §III A.
D. Bayesian conditioning
Classically, if you are interested in a random variable
R, and you learn that a correlated variable X takes the
value x, then you should update your probability dis-
tribution for R from the prior, P (R), to the posterior,
P (R|X = x). This is known as Bayesian Conditioning.
In the conditional states formalism, whenever there is
7a hybrid region, regardless of the causal relationship be-
tween the classical variable X and the quantum region
A, you can always assign a joint state ρXA. When you
learn that X takes the value x, the state of the quantum
region should be updated from ρA to ρA|X=x. This is
quantum Bayesian conditioning.
E. How to read this paper
This article is mainly concerned with the consequences
of conditioning a quantum region on classical data, so the
main objects of interest are hybrid conditional states with
classical conditioning regions. In this case the set of oper-
ators under consideration does not depend on the causal
relation between the two regions. However, thus far we
have only considered conditioning a quantum region on a
single classical variable. Suppose instead that you learn
the values of two classical variables, X1 and X2, and you
want to update your beliefs about a quantum region A.
In this case, there are some causal scenarios where your
beliefs cannot be correctly represented by a joint state
ρAX1X2 . In such scenarios, our results do not apply.
To properly explain the distinction between the types
of causal scenario to which our results apply and those to
which they do not requires delving into the conditional
states formalism in more detail. However, this extra ma-
terial is not necessary for understanding most of our re-
sults, so the reader who is eager to get to the discussion of
compatibility, improvement and pooling can skip ahead
to §IV, referring back to §III as necessary.
The next section covers the required background for
understanding the scope of our results and gives several
examples of experimental scenarios to which our results
apply. In particular, all of the causal scenarios that have
been considered to date in the literature on compatibility,
improvement, and pooling are within the scope of our
results. Indeed, given that all previous results have been
derived in the context of specific causal scenarios, our
results represent a substantial increase in the breadth of
applicability, even if they do not yet cover all conceivable
cases.
III. MODELING EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIOS
USING THE CONDITIONAL STATES
FORMALISM
Table II translates various concepts and formulas from
the conventional quantum formalism into the language of
conditional states. These correspondences are described
in more detail in [1]. The meaning of most of the rows
should be evident from the discussion in the previous sec-
tion, and the rest are explained in this section as needed.
We begin by showing how conditioning a quantum re-
gion on a single classical variable works in several differ-
ent experimental scenarios. This is necessary background
knowledge for considering the more relevant scenarios in-
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FIG. 1: Quantum-classical hybrid regions with different
causal relations. Triangles represent classical variables (as
suggested by the shape of the probability simplex) and cir-
cles represent quantum regions (as suggested by the spherical
state space of a qubit). (a) Preparation procedure: a quan-
tum region B is prepared in one of a set of states depending
on the value of a classical variable X (B is in the causal future
of X). (b) Remote measurement: a measurement is made on
A, which is acausally related to B. The classical outcome
X is then acausally related to B. (c) Measurement: a mea-
surement is made on a quantum region B and the classical
variable X represents the outcome (X is in the causal future
of B).
volving conditioning on a pair of variables. The differ-
ent experiments correspond to different causal structures,
which are illustrated by directed acyclic graphs.
A. Conditioning on a single classical variable
In this section, the quantum region we are interested
in making inferences about is always denoted B and the
classical variable on which the inference is based is de-
noted X .
Example III.1. Consider the following preparation pro-
cedure. A classical random variable X with proba-
bility distribution P (X) is generated by flipping coins,
rolling dice or any other suitable procedure, and then
a quantum region is prepared in a state ρBx depend-
ing on the value of X obtained. This scenario is de-
picted in fig. 1a. Suppose that, initially, you do not
know the value of X that was obtained in this proce-
dure. In the conditional states formalism, your beliefs
about X are represented by a diagonal state ρX with
components ρX=x ≡ P (X = x). The set of states pre-
pared is represented by a conditional state ρB|X with
components ρB|X=x ≡ ρBx . Since the ⋆-product reduces
to a regular product for classical states, the joint state
of XB is ρXB = ρB|XρX . In terms of components, this
is ρXB =
∑
x P (X = x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρ
B
x . It follows that
ρXB contains sufficient information to describe an en-
semble of states, i.e. a set of states supplemented with a
probability distribution over them. Tracing over X gives
the marginal ρB = TrX
(
ρB|XρX
)
=
∑
x P (X = x)ρ
B
x ,
which is easily recognized as the ensemble average state
on B.
According to the conventional formalism, upon learn-
8Conventional Notation Conditional States Formalism
Probability distribution of X P (X) ρX
Probability that X = x P (X = x) ρX=x
Set of states on A {ρAx } ρA|X
Individual state on A ρAx ρA|X=x
POVM on A {EAx } ρX|A
Individual effect on A EAx ρX=x|A
Channel from A to B EB|A ̺B|A
Instrument {E
B|A
x } ̺XB|A
Individual Operation E
B|A
x ̺X=x,B|A
The Born rule ∀x : P (X = x) = TrA
(
EAx ρA
)
ρX = TrA
(
ρX|AρA
)
Ensemble averaging ρA =
∑
x
P (X = x)ρAx ρA = TrX
(
ρA|XρX
)
Action of a quantum channel ρB = EB|A (ρA) ρB = TrA
(
̺B|AρA
)
Composition of channels EC|A = EC|B ◦ EB|A ̺C|A = TrB
(
̺C|B̺B|A
)
State update rule ∀x : P (X = x)ρBx = E
B|A
x (ρA) ρXB = TrA
(
̺XB|AρA
)
TABLE II: Translation of concepts and equations from conventional notation to the conditional states formalism.
ing that X takes the value x, you should assign the state
that was prepared for that particular value of X to B,
which is just ρBx . However, since ρB|X=x = ρ
B
x in the
conditional states formalism, this update has the form
ρB → ρB|X=x, so it is an example of quantum Bayesian
conditioning. The interpretation of conditioning in this
scenario is as an update from the ensemble average state
to a particular state in the ensemble.
Example III.2. Suppose that A and B are two acausally
related quantum regions to which you assign the state
ρAB. The (prior) reduced state on B is ρB = TrA (ρAB).
Now suppose that you make a measurement on A with
outcome described by the variable X and that the mea-
surement is associated with a POVM {EAx }. In the condi-
tional states formalism, the measurement is represented
by a conditional state ρX|A, where ρX=x|A ≡ EAx . We
are interested in how the state for B gets updated upon
learning the outcome x of X . This causal scenario is de-
picted in fig. 1b. This is the scenario that occurs in the
EPR experiment, or more generally in “quantum steer-
ing”. The update map in this case is sometimes called a
“remote collapse rule”.
In the conditional states formalism, the joint state on
XB can be determined by belief propagation from A to
X , i.e. ρXB = TrA
(
ρX|AρAB
)
. The marginal on X
gives the outcome probabilities for the measurement and
is given by ρX = TrB (ρBX). From these, the conditional
state ρB|X is determined via ρB|X = ρBXρ
−1
X . By sub-
stituting X = x into the expression for ρB|X , we obtain
ρB|X=x. This is the state that you should assign to B
when you learn thatX = x, i.e. the update rule for the re-
mote region is just Bayesian conditioning ρB → ρB|X=x.
The updated state ρB|X=x can be expressed in terms of
the givens in the problem, i.e. the state ρAB and the
POVM elements EAx , but this is not especially instruc-
tive for present purposes. Interested readers can consult
[1], where it is shown that this form of Bayesian condi-
tioning is precisely the same as the usual remote collapse
rule in the conventional formalism.
Example III.3. Consider the case where X represents the
outcome of a direct measurement made on B and you
want to condition the state of B on the value of this out-
come. This causal scenario is depicted in fig. 1c, and is
described by an input state ρB and a conditional state
ρX|B with components given by the POVM that is being
measured. The conditional ρB|X=x is then the X = x
component of ρB|X , which can be computed from an
application of Bayes’ theorem ρB|X = ρX|B ⋆
(
ρBρ
−1
X
)
,
where ρX = TrB
(
ρX|BρB
)
. The operator ρB|X=x is the
state that should be assigned to region B upon learning
that the outcome X takes the value x.
Note that Bayesian conditioning in this case is a kind
of retrodiction: the region being conditioned upon, the
outcome of the measurement, is to the future of the con-
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FIG. 2: Causal scenario for describing measurement update
rules, or quantum instruments. A represents the system be-
fore the measurement, X is the measurement outcome and B
is the system after the measurement has been completed.
ditioned region, the quantum input to the measurement.
This application of Bayesian conditioning to retrodiction
is discussed in detail in [1] and is shown to generate pre-
cisely the same operational consequences as would be ob-
tained in the conventional formalism for retrodiction.
Example III.4. Finally, consider a direct measurement
again, but where the region of interest is the quantum
output of the measurement rather than its input. Let A
and B denote the input and output respectively. Since
these are distinct regions, they must be given distinct
labels in the conditional states formalism, whereas con-
ventionally they would be given the same label as they
represent the same system at two different times. The
classical variable representing the outcome is X . We are
interested in how the state of B should be updated upon
learning the value of X . The relevant causal structure
is depicted in fig. 2. The causal arrow from X to B
represents the fact that the post-measurement state can
depend on the measurement outcome in addition to the
pre-measurement state.
In general, the rule for determining the state of the re-
gion after the measurement, given the state of the region
before the measurement and the outcome, is not uniquely
determined by the POVM associated with the measure-
ment. The most general possible rule is conventionally
represented by a quantum instrument, which is a set of
trace-nonincreasing completely positive maps, {E
B|A
x }.
The operation E
B|A
x maps a pre-measurement state ρA
to the unnormalized post-measurement state that should
be assigned when the outcome is x, i.e. E
B|A
x (ρA) =
P (X = x)ρBx , where P (X = x) is the probability of
obtaining outcome x and ρBx is the normalized post-
measurement state. This implies that if a measurement
is associated with a POVM {EAx }, then the quantum in-
strument must satisfy TrB
(
E
B|A
x (ρA)
)
= TrA
(
EAx ρA
)
for all input states ρA.
It is not too difficult to see how to represent a quantum
instrument in the conditional states formalism. First,
note that the measurement generates an ensemble of
states for B, i.e. for each possible outcome X = x there
is a probability P (X = x), given by the Born rule, and
a corresponding state ρBx for B, which is the state that
should be assigned to B when the outcome X = x oc-
curs. We have already seen that an ensemble of states
can be written as a joint state ρXB of the hybrid region
XB via ρXB =
∑
x P (X = x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρ
B
x . What is
needed then, is a way of determining a joint state ρXB
of XB, given a state ρA of region A. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, this can be done by specifying a causal condi-
tional state ̺XB|A and using belief propagation to obtain
ρXB = TrA
(
̺XB|AρA
)
. The POVM that is measured by
this procedure is given by the components of the condi-
tional state ̺X|A = TrB
(
̺XB|A
)
. The precise relation
between the instrument {E
B|A
x } and the causal condi-
tional state ̺XB|A is obtained through the Jamio lkowski
isomorphism and is described in [1].
If you assign a prior state ρA to the region before
the measurement, and describe the quantum instru-
ment implementing the measurement by ̺XB|A, then
the ensemble of output states is described by ρXB =
TrA
(
ρXB|AρA
)
. The marginal state ρB = TrX (ρXB) is
then your prior state for the output region and ρX =
TrB (ρXB) gives the Born rule probabilities for the mea-
surement outcomes. The states in the ensemble, ρB|X=x,
can then be computed from the conditional ρB|X =
ρXBρ
−1
X . Upon learning that X = x, you should up-
date your beliefs about B by Bayesian conditioning, i.e.
by the rule ρB → ρB|X=x.
Note that Bayesian conditioning is not a rule that
maps your prior state about the measurement’s input
to your posterior state about the measurement’s output,
which would be a map of the form ρA → ρB|X=x. The
projection postulate is an instance of this latter kind of
update, but it is not an instance of Bayesian condition-
ing. Bayesian conditioning is a map from prior states
to posterior states of one and the same region. The map
ρB → ρB|X=x, which takes the prior state of the measure-
ment’s output to the posterior state of the measurement’s
output is an instance of quantum Bayesian conditioning.
In the conventional formalism it corresponds to a transi-
tion from the output of a non-selective state-update rule,
which you would apply when you know that a measure-
ment has occurred but not which outcome was obtained,
to the output of the corresponding selective state-update
rule, which applies when you do know the outcome.
B. Conditioning on two classical variables
The problems discussed in this paper concern infer-
ences made by multiple (typically two) agents based on
different data. Thus, we are interested in conditioning a
quantum region on the values of more than one classi-
cal variable, which may or may not be known to all the
agents.
It is convenient to introduce a few more notational
conventions to handle such scenarios. Since we are us-
ing letters to denote regions, we use numbers to refer to
agents. Given that regions A and B are prominent in
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our article, it is confusing to use the usual names Alice
and Bob for our numbered agents, so we refer to agent
1 as Wanda and agent 2 as Theo. Occasionally, we will
refer to a decision-maker, whom we call Debbie, and for
which we use the number 0. A classical variable that
agent j learns during the course of their inference pro-
cedure is denoted Xj . The quantum region about which
the agents are making inferences is denoted B, and, when
making analogies between quantum theory and classical
probability theory, the classical variable analogous to B
is denoted Y . Any other auxiliary quantum regions in-
volved in setting up the causal scenario are denoted A
(or A1, A2, . . . if there is more than one of them) and
auxiliary classical variables are denoted Z (or Z1, Z2, . . .
if there is more than one of them).
Depending on the causal relations between the classical
variables Xj and an elementary quantum region B, it is
possible to construct scenarios in which the available in-
formation about the quantum region cannot be summed
up by the assignment of a single state (positive density
operator) to the region. For example, this is familiar in
the case of pre- and post-selected ensembles, which are
described by a pair of states rather than a single state
in the formalism of Aharonov et. al. [45]. Although our
results apply to a much wider variety of causal scenarios
than those typically discussed in the literature on com-
patibility, improvement, and pooling, we still do not con-
sider situations in which the region of interest has to be
described by a more exotic object than a single quantum
state. Of course, a general quantum theory of Bayesian
inference should be able to address such scenarios, but
that is a topic for future work.
Mathematically speaking, our results apply whenever
the following condition holds:
Condition III.5. The joint region consisting of the
quantum region of interest, B, and all the classical vari-
ables involved in the inference procedure, X1, X2 . . ., can
be assigned a joint state ρBX1X2... (which may be either
an acausal or a causal state).
Consider the case of two classical variables, X1 andX2,
and suppose that a joint state ρBX1X2 exists. From this,
one can compute the reduced states ρB, ρX1 and ρX2 , and
the joint states ρBX1 , ρBX2 and ρX1X2 . From these, one
can easily compute the conditional states ρB|X1 , ρB|X2
and ρB|X1X2 . If Wanda learns that X1 = x1 then she
updates ρB to her posterior state ρB|X1=x1 , and if Theo
learns that X2 = x2 then he updates ρB to his poste-
rior state ρB|X2=x2 . An agent who learns both outcomes
would update to ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 . The existence of the
joint state ρX1X2B ensures that all the posterior states
ρB|X1=x1 , ρB|X2=x2 and ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 are well defined.
Similar comments apply when there are more than two
classical variables.
In the remainder of this section, we give several ex-
amples of causal scenarios in which this condition does
apply, in order to emphasize the generality of our re-
sults, and we provide some examples where it does not,
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FIG. 3: Introducing an extra classical variable to the causal
scenarios depicted in fig. 1 via post-processing.
to clarify the limitations to their applicability. All the
examples involve inferences about a quantum region B
based on two classical variables X1 and X2.
1. Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state can
be assigned
Example III.6. Perhaps the simplest class of causal sce-
narios in which a joint state can be assigned are those
in which the second variable X2 is obtained via a post-
processing of the variableX1, i.e. X2 is obtained fromX1
via conditional probabilities P (X2|X1), or equivalently a
classical conditional state ρX2|X1 . Only X1 is directly
related to the quantum region B and any correlations
between X2 and B are mediated by X1. Examples of
this sort of causal scenario are depicted in fig. 3.
In all these scenarios, we already know from §III A that
BX1 can be assigned a joint state ρBX1 and then the joint
state of BX1X2 is just
ρBX1X2 = ρX2|X1ρBX1 , (2)
so condition III.5 is satisfied. These examples are im-
portant because they imply that arbitrary classical pro-
cessing may be performed on a classical variable without
changing our ability to assign a joint state. In particular,
this is used in §VB where hybrid sufficient statistics are
defined as a kind of processing of a classical data variable.
Z
X X
B
1 2
FIG. 4: Wanda and Theo learn variables that are correlated
with a variable used to prepare region B.
Example III.7. Consider a generalization of the prepara-
tion scenario depicted in fig. 1a to the scenario depicted
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in fig. 4, which adds two further classical variables that
depend on the preparation variable. In this scenario, a
classical random variable Z is sampled from a probabil-
ity distribution P (Z) and, upon obtaining the outcome
Z = z, a region B is prepared in the state ρB|Z=z. Some
data about Z is revealed to the two agents: X1 to Wanda,
and X2 to Theo. X1 and X2 may be coarse-grainings of
Z, or they may even depend on Z stochastically. For
example, if Z is the outcome of a dice roll, then X1 and
X2 could both be binary variables, with X1 indicating
whether Z is odd or even and X2 indicating whether it
is ≤ 3. Generally, the dependence of X1 and X2 on Z is
given by classical conditional states ρX1|Z and ρX2|Z . A
joint state for X1X2B can be defined in this case via
ρX1X2B = TrZ
(
ρX1|ZρX2|ZρB|ZρZ
)
, (3)
so, again,condition III.5 is satisfied.
B A
XX
A
1 2
1 2
FIG. 5: Wanda and Theo learn about B by making measure-
ments on two acausally related regions A1 and A2.
Example III.8. Consider the generalization of the remote
measurement scenario depicted in fig. 1b to a pair of re-
mote measurements, as depicted in fig. 5. This scenario
is in fact the one that is adopted in much of the literature
on compatibility and pooling [10, 24, 25]. The region of
interest, B, is acausally related to two other quantum
regions, A1 and A2, so we have a tripartite state ρA1A2B.
Direct measurements are made on A1 and A2, with out-
comes X1 and X2 respectively, and which are described
by the conditional states ρX1|A1 and ρX2|A2 respectively.
It is assumed that Wanda learns only X1 and Theo learns
only X2. In this case, we can define a tripartite acausal
state by
ρX1X2B = TrA1A2
(
ρX1|A1ρX2|A2ρA1A2B
)
. (4)
Example III.9. Consider a generalization of the direct
measurement scenario depicted in fig. 1c to the scenario
of fig. 6, which introduces two further classical variables
that depend on the measurement result. This is similar
to the second example considered in this section except
that, rather than Z being used to prepare B, it is now ob-
tained by making a direct measurement on B, described
by the conditional state ρZ|B. As before, some informa-
tion about Z is distributed to each agent, specifically,
variables X1 and X2 to Wanda and Theo respectively.
The dependence of X1 and X2 on Z is again described
Z
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FIG. 6: Wanda and Theo learn variables derived from a direct
measurement made on region B.
by conditional states ρX1|Z and ρX2|Z . In this case, a
joint state ρX1X2B can be defined as
ρX1X2B = TrZ
(
ρX1|ZρX2|Z
[
ρZ|B ⋆ ρB
])
, (5)
and conditioning on values of the classical variables yields
states that are relevant for retrodiction.
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FIG. 7: Wanda and Theo learn the results of two measure-
ments preformed in sequence.
Example III.10. Consider a generalization of the mea-
surement scenario depicted in fig. 2 to a case where a
pair of measurements are implemented in succession, as
depicted in fig. 7. This scenario has been considered in
the context of compatibility and pooling by Jacobs [28],
as discussed in §IVC2. The input region of the first mea-
surement is denoted A1. The output of the first measure-
ment, which is also the input of the second, is denoted A2,
and the output of the second measurement, which is the
region about which Wanda and Theo seek to make infer-
ences, is denoted by B. The classical variables describing
the outcomes of the two measurements are denoted X1
and X2 respectively, and it is assumed that Wanda learns
X1 while Theo learns X2.
Suppose that Wanda and Theo agree on the input state
ρA1 and on the causal conditional states, ̺X1A2|A1 and
̺X2B|A2 , that describe the measurements. A joint state
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can then be assigned to X1X2B via
ρX1X2B = TrA1A2
(
̺X2B|A2̺X1A2|A1ρA1
)
. (6)
The interpretation of eq. (6) is that the two consecutive
measurements can be thought of as a preparation pro-
cedure for B that prepares the states in the ensemble
ρX1X2B depending on the values of X1 and X2.
These examples should serve to give an idea of the type
of scenarios to which our results apply.
2. Examples of causal scenarios in which a joint state
cannot be assigned
X
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FIG. 8: Wanda learns a preparation variables and Theo learns
a measurement variable. Learning both variables gives a pre-
and post-selected ensemble.
Example III.11. Consider the prepare-and-measure sce-
nario depicted in fig. 8. Here, B is prepared in a state
depending on the preparation variable X1 and then B
is measured, resulting in the outcome X2. More con-
cretely, consider the case where B is a qubit prepared in
the {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis and measured in the {|+〉B , |−〉B}
basis, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Suppose that X2 takes
the value X2 = 0 for |+〉B and X2 = 1 for |−〉B. Al-
though it is possible to assign joint states to X1B and to
X2B, the conditional states that these assignments imply
are not compatible with any joint state for X1X2B.
To see this, note that the joint states forX1B andX2B
have to be of the form
ρX1B = P (X1 = 0) |0〉 〈0|X1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|B
+ P (X1 = 1) |1〉 〈1|X1 ⊗ |1〉 〈1|B (7)
ρX2B = P (X2 = 0) |0〉 〈0|X2 ⊗ |+〉 〈+|B
+ P (X2 = 1) |1〉 〈1|X2 ⊗ |−〉 〈−|B , (8)
where P (X1) is the distribution of the preparation vari-
able and P (X2) is the Born rule probability distribution
for the outcomes of the measurement.
Then, ρB|X1=x1 is a definite state in the {|0〉B , |1〉B}
basis and ρB|X2=x2 is a definite state in the {|+〉B , |−〉B}
basis. Any putative ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 , derived from a joint
state of all three regions, would then have to have definite
values for measurements in both the {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis
and in the {|+〉B , |−〉B} basis. There is no state with this
property because these are complimentary observables.
Conditioning on both X1 = x1 and X2 = x2 repre-
sents a case of pre- and post-selection, and, as argued by
Aharonov et. al. [45], the concept of a quantum state has
to be generalized in order to handle such cases.
XX1 2
BA
FIG. 9: Learning both the outcome of a direct measurement
and the outcome of a remote measurement.
Example III.12. Consider two acausally related quantum
regions A and B. Here, B is the region of interest, but di-
rect measurements are made on both A and B, resulting
in the classical variables X1 and X2 respectively. This is
depicted in fig. 9. Formally, this is very similar to pre-
and post-selection and a joint state of X1X2B is ruled
out for similar reasons.
Suppose that A and B are qubits and that ρAB =
|Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|AB is a singlet state, where |Ψ
−〉AB =
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)AB. If X1 is the result of a measurement
of A in the {|0〉A , |1〉A} basis and X2 is the result of mea-
suring B in the {|+〉B , |−〉B} basis then, as before, the
state ρB|X1=x1 would have to be a definite state in the
{|0〉B , |1〉B} basis and ρB|X2=x2 would have to be a def-
inite state in the {|+〉B , |−〉B} basis. The putative joint
state would then have to have a conditional with com-
ponents ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 that are definite in both bases,
which is not possible in the formalism as it currently
stands.
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF QUANTUM STATES
This section describes our Bayesian approach to the
compatibility of quantum states. We give alternative
derivations of the BFM compatibility criterion from the
point of view of objective and subjective Bayesianism. In
each case, we begin by reviewing the corresponding ar-
gument in the classical case in order to build intuition,
and draw out the parallels to the quantum case using the
conditional states formalism.
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A. Objective Bayesian compatibility
First consider compatibility for a classical random vari-
able Y . For the objective Bayesian, the only way that two
agents’ probability assignments can differ is if they have
had access to different data, so suppose Wanda learns
the value of a random variable X1 and Theo learns the
value of a different random variable X2. According to
the objective Bayesian, there is a unique prior proba-
bility distribution P (Y,X1, X2) that both Wanda and
Theo ought to initially assign to the three variables before
they have observed the values of the Xj ’s. Both Wanda
and Theo’s prior distribution for Y alone is simply the
marginal P (Y ) =
∑
X1,X2
P (Y,X1, X2). Upon observing
a particular value xj of Xj, Wanda and Theo update to
their posterior distributions P (Y |Xj = xj).
Now suppose that we don’t know the details of how
Wanda and Theo arrived at their probability assignments
and we are simply told that, at some specific point in
time, Wanda assigns some distribution Q1(Y ) to Y and
Theo assigns a distribution Q2(Y ) (different from Q1(Y )
in general). For the objective Bayesian, this can only
arise in the manner described above, so the notion of
compatibility is defined as follows.
Definition IV.1 (Classical objective Bayesian compati-
bility). Two probability distributions Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y )
are compatible if it is possible to construct a pair of
random variables, X1 and X2, and a joint distribu-
tion P (Y,X1, X2) such that Q1(Y ) can be obtained by
Bayesian conditioning on X1 = x1 for some value x1,
and Q2(Y ) can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning on
X2 = x2 for some value x2, that is,
Qj(Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj) (9)
for some values xj of Xj. Further, we require that
P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2) 6= 0 so that there is a possibil-
ity for both outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.
This definition of compatibility is equivalent to the re-
quirement that the supports of Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) have
nontrivial intersection, where the support of a prob-
ability distribution P (Y ) is defined as supp[P (Y )] ≡
{y | P (Y = y) > 0}.
Theorem IV.2. Two distributions Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y )
satisfy definition IV.1, i.e. they are compatible in the ob-
jective Bayesian sense, iff they share some common sup-
port, i.e.
supp [Q1(Y )] ∩ supp [Q2(Y )] 6= ∅. (10)
The proof makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma IV.3. If a probability distribution P (X,Y ) sat-
isfies P (X = x) 6= 0 then supp [P (Y |X = x)] ⊆
supp [P (Y )].
Proof. The condition P (X = x) 6= 0 implies that P (Y =
y|X = x) is well defined for all y. Let ker [P (Y )] =
{y | P (Y = y) = 0}, i.e. ker [P (Y )] is the complement of
supp [P (Y )]. Let y ∈ ker [P (Y )]. Since P (Y = y) = 0,
we have
∑
x′ P (Y = y,X = x
′) = 0, which implies that
P (Y = y,X = x′) = 0 for every value x′ and conse-
quently that P (Y = y|X = x) = 0. In other words,
y ∈ ker [P (Y )] implies y ∈ ker [P (Y |X = x)], which
means that ker [P (Y )] ⊆ ker [P (Y |X = x)], or equiva-
lently supp [P (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [P (Y )].
Proof of theorem IV.2.
The “only if” half :
It is given that there is a joint distribution P (Y,X1, X2)
such that Qj(Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj). Since P (X1 =
x1, X2 = x2) 6= 0, P (Y |X1 = x1, X2 = x2) exists and, by
lemma IV.3, it must satisfy
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1, X2 = x2)] ⊆
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1)] (11)
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1, X2 = x2)] ⊆
supp [P (Y |X2 = x2)] . (12)
Since every probability distribution has nontrivial sup-
port, supp[P (Y |X1 = x1, X2 = x2)] 6= ∅, so
supp [P (Y |X1 = x1)] ∩ supp [P (Y |X2 = x2)] 6= ∅. (13)
The “if” half :
Given that Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) have intersecting support,
one can find a normalized probability distribution Q0 (Y )
such that
Q1(Y ) = p1Q0 (Y ) + (1− p1)Q
′
1(Y ), (14)
Q2(Y ) = p2Q0 (Y ) + (1− p2)Q
′
2(Y ), (15)
where Q′1(Y ) and Q
′
2(Y ) are each normalized probability
distributions and 0 < p1, p2 ≤ 1.
This decomposition can be used to construct two ran-
dom variables, X1 and X2, and a joint distribution
P (Y,X1, X2) such that P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2) 6= 0 and
Qj(Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj) for some values x1 and x2. Let
X1 andX2 be bit-valued variables that take values {0, 1},
and define
P (Y |X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = Q0(Y ) (16)
P (Y |X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = Q
′
1(Y ) (17)
P (Y |X1 = 1, X2 = 0) = Q
′
2(Y ). (18)
The result of conditioning on (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) can be
taken to be an arbitrary distribution, denoted by N(Y ),
i.e.
P (Y |X1 = 1, X2 = 1) = N(Y ). (19)
Next, define the following distribution over X1 and X2:
P (X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = p1p2 (20)
P (X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = (1− p1)p2 (21)
P (X1 = 1, X2 = 0) = p1 (1− p2) (22)
P (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) = (1− p1) (1− p2) . (23)
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Using these, we can define P (Y,X1, X2) =
P (Y |X1, X2)P (X1, X2). It is straightforward to
verify that this satisfies P (X1 = 0, X2 = 0) = p1p2 > 0
and that P (Y |X1 = 0) and P (Y |X2 = 0) are equal to
the right-hand sides of eqs. (14) and (15). Consequently,
they are equal to Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) respectively.
The “only if” part of the proof of theorem IV.2 estab-
lishes that intersecting supports is a necessary require-
ment for objective Bayesian state assignments. On the
other hand, the “if” part only establishes sufficiency for
causal scenarios that support generic joint states. For a
given causal scenario, i.e. a given set of causal relations
holding among Y , X1 and X2, there may be restrictions
on the joint probability distributions that can arise. As
an extreme example, if the causal structure is such that
the composite variable Y X1 and the elementary vari-
able X2 are neither connected by some direct or indirect
causal influence, nor connected by a common cause, then
they will be statistically independent and the joint distri-
bution will factorize as P (Y,X1, X2) = P (Y,X1)P (X2).
Under such a restriction, there are certain pairs of states
Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) that have intersecting support, but
Wanda and Theo could never come to assign them by
conditioning on X1 and X2. For instance, in the exam-
ple just mentioned, Q2(Y ) must be equal to the prior
over Y and consequently, by lemma IV.3, the only pairs
Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) that can arise by such conditioning
are pairs for which the support of Q1(Y ) is contained in
that of Q2(Y ). Therefore, not every pair of compatible
state assignments will arise in a given causal scenario. On
the other hand, in “generic” scenarios wherein the causal
structure does not force any conditional independences in
the joint distribution over Y , X1 and X2, the “if” part
of the proof does establish that any pair of states with
intersecting support can arise as the state assignments of
a pair of objective Bayesian agents.
Turning now to the quantum case, consider a quan-
tum region B with Hilbert space HB. For the objective
Bayesian the only way that two agents’ state assignments
to B can differ is if they have access to different data. We
represent this data by two random variables X1 and X2,
where Wanda has access to X1 and Theo has access to
X2. Assume that the causal scenario of the experiment
can be described by a joint state on the hybrid region
BX1X2, as discussed in §III B.
Given that this is an objective Bayesian approach, be-
fore Wanda and Theo observe the values of the Xj’s,
there is a unique prior state ρBX1X2 which they should
both assign, the prior state for B alone being ρB =
TrX1X2 (ρBX1X2). After Wanda and Theo observe the
values xj for Xj they update their states for B to the
posteriors ρB|Xj=xj .
Now suppose that we don’t know the details of how
Wanda and Theo arrived at their state assignments and
we are simply told that, at some specific point in time,
Wanda assigns a state σ
(1)
B to B and Theo assigns a state
σ
(2)
B (different from σ
(1)
B in general). For the objective
Bayesian, this can only arise in the manner described
above, so the condition for compatibility is that it should
be possible to construct a hybrid state ρBX1X2 over B
and two classical random variables X1 and X2 such that
σ
(j)
B = ρB|Xj=xj for some values xj of Xj .
Definition IV.4 (Quantum objective Bayesian compat-
ibility). Two quantum states σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B of a region
B are compatible if it is possible to construct a pair of
random variables X1 and X2 and a hybrid state ρBX1X2
such that σ
(1)
B can be obtained by Bayesian conditioning
on X1 = x1 for some value x1, and σ
(2)
B can be obtained
by Bayesian conditioning on X2 = x2 for some value x2,
i.e.
σ
(j)
B = ρB|Xj=xj (24)
for some values xj of Xj. Further, we require that
ρX1=x1,X2=x2 6= 0 so that there is a possibility for both
outcomes to be obtained simultaneously.
This holds whenever the BFM compatibility condition
is satisfied, as the following theorem demonstrates. Re-
call that the support of a state ρB is the span of the
eigenvectors of ρB associated with nonzero eigenvalues.
We denote it by supp [ρB].
Theorem IV.5. Two quantum states σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B of
a region B satisfy definition IV.4, i.e. they are compat-
ible in the objective Bayesian sense, iff they share some
common support, i.e.
supp
[
σ
(1)
B
]
∩ supp
[
σ
(2)
B
]
6= ∅, (25)
where ∩ indicates the geometric intersection of the sub-
spaces.
The proof of this theorem closely resembles the proof
of its classical counterpart. First, note the quantum ana-
logue of lemma IV.3.
Lemma IV.6. If a hybrid state ρXB satisfies ρX=x 6= 0
then supp
[
ρB|X=x
]
⊆ supp [ρB].
Proof. The condition ρX=x 6= 0 implies that ρB|X=x is
well defined. Let ker [ρB] = {|ψ〉B | ρB |ψ〉B = 0}, i.e.
ker [ρB] is the orthogonal complement of supp [ρB]. Let
|ψ〉B ∈ ker [ρB]. Then 〈ψ|B TrX (ρBX) |ψ〉B = 0. This
implies that 〈ψ|B ρB,X=x′ |ψ〉B = 0 for every x
′ be-
cause each operator ρB,X=x′ is positive. Consequently,
〈ψ|B ρB|X=x |ψ〉B = 0. In other words, if |ψ〉B ∈
ker [ρB] then |ψ〉B ∈ ker
[
ρB|X=x
]
, which means that
ker [ρB] ⊆ ker
[
ρB|X=x
]
, or equivalently supp
[
ρB|X=x
]
⊆
supp [ρB].
Proof of theorem IV.5.
The “only if” half :
It is given that there is a hybrid joint state ρBX1X2 such
that σ
(j)
B = ρB|Xj=xj for some values xj of Xj . Since
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ρX1=x1,X2=x2 6= 0, the conditional state ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2
is well defined. Lemma IV.6 then implies that
supp
[
ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2
]
⊆ supp
[
ρB|X1=x1
]
(26)
supp
[
ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2
]
⊆ supp
[
ρB|X2=x2
]
. (27)
Since ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 has nontrivial support, it follows
that
supp
[
ρB|X1=x1
]
∩ supp
[
ρB|X2=x2
]
6= ∅. (28)
The “if” half :
Given that σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B have intersecting support, one
can find a quantum state µB such that
σ
(1)
B = p1µB + (1− p1) η
(1)
B , (29)
σ
(2)
B = p2µB + (1− p2) η
(2)
B , (30)
where η
(1)
B and η
(2)
B are each quantum states and 0 <
p1, p2 ≤ 1.
This decomposition can be used to construct two clas-
sical variables, X1 and X2 and a hybrid state ρBX1X2
such that ρX1=x1,X2=x2 6= 0 and σ
(j)
B = ρB|Xj=xj for
some values x1 and x2. Let X1 and X2 be bit-valued
variables, and define
ρB|X1=0,X2=0 = µB (31)
ρB|X1=0,X2=1 = η
(1)
B (32)
ρB|X1=1,X2=0 = η
(2)
B . (33)
The result of conditioning on (X1 = 1, X2 = 1) can be
taken to be an arbitrary state, denoted νB , i.e.
ρB|X1=1,X2=1 = νB. (34)
Next, define the following (classical) state over X1 and
X2:
ρX1,X2 = p1p2 |00〉 〈00|X1X2
+ (1− p1)p2 |01〉 〈01|X1X2
+ p1 (1− p2) |10〉 〈10|X1X2
+ (1− p2) (1− p2) |11〉 〈11|X1X2 . (35)
This can be combined with the conditional states defined
above to obtain
ρBX1X2 = ρB|X1X2ρX1X2
= p1p2
(
µB ⊗ |00〉 〈00|X1X2
)
+ (1− p1)p2
(
η
(1)
B ⊗ |01〉 〈01|X1X2
)
+ p1 (1− p2)
(
η
(2)
B ⊗ |10〉 〈10|X1X2
)
+ (1− p2) (1− p2)
(
νB ⊗ |11〉 〈11|X1X2
)
. (36)
It is then easy to verify that ρB|X1=0 and ρB|X2=0 are
equal to the right-hand sides of eqs. (29) and (30), and
consequently are equal to σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B respectively.
As noted in the classical case, the “if” part of the
proof only establishes sufficiency of the BFM criterion for
causal scenarios that support generic joint states. Cer-
tain causal scenarios may enforce a restriction on the
pairs of states σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B that Wanda and Theo can
come to assign by conditioning on X1 and X2. For in-
stance, consider the causal scenarios depicted in fig. 3,
where X2 is obtained by post-processing of X1, so that
all correlations between X2 and B are mediated by X1.
In this case, the only pairs σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B that can arise
by conditioning on X1 and X2 are those for which the
support of σ
(1)
B is contained in that of σ
(2)
B . We are led
to the same conclusion as we found classically: although
BFM compatibility is necessary in any causal scenario,
not every pair of BFM compatible state assignments can
arise in every causal scenario. Nonetheless, we can always
find a causal scenario wherein there are no restrictions on
the joint state ρBX1X2 and therefore no restriction on the
states to which a pair of agents can be led by Bayesian
conditioning. The causal scenario considered by BFM,
where X1 and X2 are the outcomes of a pair of remote
measurements on B (depicted in fig. 5) is one such exam-
ple, as is the causal scenario considered by Jacobs, where
X1 and X2 are the outcomes of a sequential pair of mea-
surements and B is the output (depicted in fig. 5)[60].
B. Subjective Bayesian compatibility
A subjective Bayesian cannot use the approach just
discussed in general, since it depends on postulating a
unique prior state over B, X1, and X2 (or Y , X1, and
X2 in the classical case) that all agents agree upon before
collecting their data. Given that the choice of prior is an
unanalyzable matter of belief for the subjectivist, there
is no reason why Wanda and Theo need to agree on a
prior at the outset and, further, there is no reason why
the difference in their probability assignments has to be
explained by their having had access to different data in
the first place. If it happens that Wanda and Theo did
have a shared prior before collecting their data then the
argument runs through, but for the subjective Bayesian
this is the exception rather than the rule. In fact, since
subjective Bayesians do not rule out as irrational the pos-
sibility of agents starting out with contradictory beliefs,
it might seem that there is no role for compatibility cri-
teria in this approach at all.
However, this is not the case since, although subjec-
tive Bayesians do not analyze how agents arrive at their
beliefs, they are interested in whether it is possible for
them to reach inter-subjective agreement in the future,
i.e. whether it is possible for them to resolve their dif-
ferences by experiment or whether their disagreement is
so extreme that one of them has to make a wholesale
revision of their beliefs in order to reach agreement. In
the classical case, a subjective Bayesian will therefore
say that two probability assignments Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y )
to a random variable Y are compatible if it is possible
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to construct an experiment, for which Wanda and Theo
agree upon a statistical model, i.e. a likelihood function
P (X |Y ), such that at least one outcome X = x of the
experiment would cause Wanda and Theo to assign iden-
tical probabilities when they update their probabilities
by Bayesian conditioning. In other words, the subjective
Bayesian account of compatibility is in terms of the pos-
sibility of future agreement, in contrast to the objective
Bayesian account, which relies on a guarantee of agree-
ment in the past [61]
Definition IV.7 (Classical subjective Bayesian compati-
bility). Two probability distributions, Q1(Y ) andQ2(Y ),
are compatible if it is possible to construct a random
variable X and a conditional probability distribution
P (X |Y ) (often called a likelihood function in this con-
text) such that there exists a value x of X for which∑
Y P (X = x|Y )Qj(Y ) 6= 0 and
P1(Y |X = x) = P2(Y |X = x) (37)
where Pj(Y |X) ≡ P (X |Y )Qj(Y )/
∑
Y P (X |Y )Qj(Y ).
It turns out that the mathematical criteria that Q1(Y )
and Q2(Y ) must satisfy in order to be compatible in this
subjective Bayesian sense are precisely the same as those
required for objective Bayesian compatibility.
Theorem IV.8. Two probability distributions Q1(Y )
and Q2(Y ) satisfy definition IV.7, i.e. they are compati-
ble in the subjective Bayesian sense, iff they share some
common support, i.e.
supp [Q1(Y )] ∩ supp [Q2(Y )] 6= ∅. (38)
Proof.
The “only if” half :
Since Pj(Y |X = x) is derived from Qj(Y ) by Bayesian
conditioning, it follows from lemma IV.3 that
supp [P1 (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [Q1 (Y )] (39)
supp [P2 (Y |X = x)] ⊆ supp [Q2 (Y )] . (40)
However, by assumption, P1 (Y |X = x) = P2 (Y |X = x),
so the left-hand sides of eqs. (39) and (40) are equal.
It follows that Q1 (Y ) and Q2(Y ) have some common
support, namely, supp [P1 (S|X = x)].
The “if” half :
By assumption, there is at least one value y of Y belong-
ing to the common support of Q1 (Y ) and Q2 (Y ). Let
X be a classical bit and define the likelihood function
P (X = 0|Y = y) = 1 P (X = 1|Y = y) = 0 (41)
P (X = 0|Y 6= y) = 0 P (X = 1|Y 6= y) = 1. (42)
If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood function,
then, upon observing X = 0, they will update their dis-
tributions to
Pj(Y = y
′|X = 0) =
P (X = 0|Y = y′)Qj(Y = y′)∑
y′ P (X = 0|Y = y
′)Qj(Y = y′)
= δy,y′, (43)
which is independent of j and hence brings them into
agreement.
In the quantum case, if Wanda and Theo assign states
σ
(j)
S to a quantum region then they are compatible if
there is some classical data X that they can collect about
the system, for which Wanda and Theo agree upon a
statistical model, such that observing at least one value
x of X would cause their state assignments to become
identical.
Definition IV.9 (Quantum subjective Bayesian com-
patibility). Two states σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B are compatible if
it is possible to construct a random variable X and a
conditional state ρX|B (which we call a likelihood oper-
ator) such that there exists a value x of X for which
TrB
(
ρX=x|Bσ
(j)
B
)
6= 0 and
ρ
(1)
B|X=x = ρ
(2)
B|X=x (44)
where ρ
(j)
B|X=x is given by the quantum Bayes’ theorem:
ρ
(j)
B|X=x ≡
(
ρX=x|B ⋆ σ
(j)
B
)
/TrB
(
ρX=x|Bσ
(j)
B
)
.
Once again, subjective Bayesian compatibility has the
same mathematical consequences as its objective coun-
terpart. Both are equivalent to requiring the BFM crite-
rion.
Theorem IV.10. Two states σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B satisfy def-
inition IV.9, i.e. they are compatible in the subjective
Bayesian sense, iff they share common support, i.e.
supp
[
σ
(1)
B
]
∩ supp
[
σ
(2)
B
]
6= ∅, (45)
where ∩ denotes the geometric intersection.
Proof.
The “only if” half :
Since ρ
(j)
B|X=x is derived from σ
(j)
B by Bayesian condition-
ing, it follows from lemma IV.6 that
supp
[
ρ
(1)
B|X=x
]
⊆ supp
[
σ
(1)
B
]
(46)
supp
[
ρ
(2)
B|X=x
]
⊆ supp
[
σ
(2)
B
]
. (47)
However, by assumption, ρ
(1)
B|X=x = ρ
(2)
B|X=x, so the left-
hand sides of eqs. (46) and (47) are equal. It follows
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that σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B have some common support, namely,
supp
[
ρ
(1)
B|X=x
]
.
The “if” half :
By assumption, the supports of σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B have non-
trivial intersection. It follows that there is a pure state
|ψ〉B ∈ HB in the common support. Let X be a classical
bit and define the likelihood operator
ρX|B =
|0〉 〈0|X ⊗ |ψ〉 〈ψ|B + |1〉 〈1|X ⊗ (IB − |ψ〉 〈ψ|B) . (48)
If Wanda and Theo agree to use this likelihood operator,
then, upon observing X = 0 they will update their states
to
ρ
(j)
B|X=0 =
ρX=0|B ⋆ σ
(j)
B
TrB
(
ρX=0|Bσ
(j)
B
) = |ψ〉 〈ψ|B , (49)
which is independent of j and hence brings them into
agreement.
C. Comparison to other approaches
1. Brun, Finkelstein and Mermin
The original BFM argument [24], which is objective
Bayesian in flavor, is divided into arguments for the ne-
cessity and sufficiency of their criterion. To establish
sufficiency, they show that for any pair of state assign-
ments that satisfy their criterion, one can find a triple
of distinct systems, and a quantum state thereon, such
that if Wanda measures one system and Theo another,
then for some pair of outcomes Wanda and Theo are led
to update their description of the third system to the
given pair of state assignments. This is equivalent to the
“if” part of our theorem IV.5 when applied to the remote
measurement scenario depicted in fig. 5. The argument
provided by BFM for the necessity of their criterion is
based on a set of reasonable-sounding requirements. For
example, their first requirement is:
If anybody describes a system with a density
matrix ρ, then nobody can find it to be in a
pure state in the null space of ρ. For although
anyone can get a measurement outcome that
everyone has assigned nonzero probabilities,
nobody can get an outcome that anybody
knows to be impossible.
If one is adopting an approach wherein quantum states
describe the information, knowledge, or beliefs of agents,
then the notion of finding a system “to be in a pure
state” is inappropriate, as emphasized by Caves, Fuchs
and Schack [29]. However, even glossing over this, their
argument does not satisfy an ideal to which a proper ob-
jective Bayesian account of compatibility should strive,
namely, of being justified by a general methodology for
Bayesian inference. This ideal is illustrated by the deriva-
tion of the objective Bayesian criterion of classical com-
patibility presented in §IVA: if a pair of agents obey
the strictures of objective Bayesianism, i.e. assigning the
same ignorance priors and updating their probabilities
via Bayesian conditioning, then they will never encounter
a situation in which the compatibility condition does not
hold, and conversely if the compatibility condition holds,
it is always possible for them to come to their state as-
signments by Bayesian updating.
Because we have proposed a methodology for quantum
Bayesian inference, we can achieve this ideal in the quan-
tum case as well. Indeed, the close parallel between the
proofs of the classical and quantum compatibility the-
orems demonstrates that one can achieve the ideal in
the quantum context to precisely the same extent that it
can be achieved in the classical context. Whilst our ar-
gument for sufficiency of the BFM criterion (the second
part of our proof of theorem IV.5) is mathematically sim-
ilar to BFM’s argument for sufficiency, it is only against
the background of our framework of quantum conditional
states that it becomes possible to identify the update rule
used by Wanda and Theo as an instance of Bayesian con-
ditioning, and thus a special case of a general methodol-
ogy for Bayesian inference.
A second point to note is that in our argument for the
compatibility condition, we consider a triple of space-
time regions that do not necessarily correspond to three
distinct systems at a given time — the case considered
by BFM. The causal relation between them might in-
stead be any of those depicted in figs. 3–7, or indeed any
scenario wherein all the available information about the
quantum region can be captured by assigning a single
quantum state. Thus, our results generalize the range
of applicability of the BFM compatibility criterion to a
broader set of causal scenarios.
2. Jacobs
Jacobs [28] has also considered the compatibility of
state assignments using an approach that is objective
Bayesian in flavor. In his analysis, the region of interest
is the output of a sequence of measurements made one
after the other on the same system, and Wanda and Theo
have information about the outcomes of distinct subsets
of those measurements. A simple version of this scenario
is where there is a sequence of two measurements, where
the outcome of the first measurement is known to Wanda
and the outcome of the second is known to Theo. This is
just the causal scenario depicted in fig. 7, and as empha-
sized there, such a scenario falls within the scope of our
approach. In the objective Bayesian framework, Wanda
and Theo agree on the input state to the pair of measure-
ments and they agree on the quantum instruments that
describe each measurement. Jacobs shows that if Wanda
and Theo’s state assignments are obtained in this way,
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then they must satisfy the BFM compatibility criterion,
that is, he provides an argument for the necessity of the
BFM compatibility criterion in this causal context.
If Wanda and Theo come to their state assignments for
B using Jacobs’ scheme, then, as explained in §III B, their
prior knowledge of B and the two outcome variables, X1
and X2, can be described by a joint state ρBX1X2 . Af-
ter observing values x1 and x2 respectively, they come to
assign states ρB|X1=x1 and ρB|X2=x2 , which are derived
from the conditional states of the joint state ρBX1X2 .
Such a pair of states satisfies the definition IV.4 of quan-
tum objective Bayesian compatibility. Theorem IV.5
then implies that their state assignments satisfy the BFM
compatibility criterion. Conversely, because the set of
joint states ρBX1X2 which can arise in this causal scenario
is unrestricted (see footnote [60]), it also follows from
theorem IV.5 that for any pair of state assignments sat-
isfying the BFM criterion, Wanda and Theo could come
to assign those states in this causal scenario. These re-
sults can be generalized to the case of a longer sequence
of measurements with the outcomes distributed arbitrar-
ily among a number of parties, which covers the most
general case considered by Jacobs.
To summarize, our results can be applied to Jacobs’
scenario and we recover Jacobs’ result that the BFM cri-
terion is a necessary requirement. Furthermore, we have
improved upon Jacobs’ analysis in two ways. Firstly,
we have shown that the BFM compatibility criterion is
not only a necessary condition for compatibility in this
scenario, but is sufficient as well. Secondly, our anal-
ysis demonstrates that, just as with the scenario of re-
mote measurements, the BFM criterion can be justified
in the scenario of sequential measurements by insisting
that states should be updated by Bayesian conditioning
within a general framework for quantum Bayesian infer-
ence.
3. Caves, Fuchs and Schack
In contrast to BFM and Jacobs, CFS [29] discuss the
problem of quantum state compatibility from an explic-
itly subjective Bayesian point of view. They argue that
there cannot be a unilateral requirement to impose com-
patibility criteria of any sort on subjective Bayesian de-
grees of belief because there is no unique prior quantum
state that an agent ought to assign in light of a given
collection of data. The only necessary constraint is that
states should satisfy the axioms of quantum theory, i.e.
they should be normalized density operators. In partic-
ular, it should not be viewed as irrational for two agents
to assign distinct, or even orthogonal, pure states to a
quantum system.
Whilst we agree with this argument, we think that
there is still a role for compatibility criteria within the
subjective approach. They can be viewed as a check to
see whether it is worthwhile for the agents to engage in
a particular inference procedure, and this is conceptually
distinct from viewing them as unilateral requirements
that must be imposed upon all state assignments. In
the case of BFM compatibility, the criterion of intersect-
ing supports is simply a check that agents can apply to
see if it is worth their while to try and resolve their dif-
ferences empirically by collecting more data, or whether
their disagreement is so extreme that resolving it requires
one or more of the agents to make a wholesale revision
of their beliefs. From this point of view, BFM plays the
same role as the criterion of overlapping supports does in
classical subjective Bayesian probability.
Despite their skepticism of compatibility criteria, CFS
do attempt to recast the necessity part of the BFM ar-
gument in terms that would be more acceptable to the
subjective Bayesian, i.e. they outline a series of require-
ments that a pair of subjective Bayesian agents may wish
to adopt that would lead them to assign BFM compat-
ible states. They do not provide an argument for suffi-
ciency, so this is one way in which our argument is more
complete. CFS’s argument is quite similar to the BFM
necessity argument, except that it is phrased in terms
that would be more acceptable to a subjective Bayesian.
For example, they talk about the “firm beliefs” of agents
rather than saying that systems are “found to be” in cer-
tain pure states. However, this line of argument is still
open to an objection that we leveled against the BFM
argument. In our view, compatibility criteria should be
derived from the inference methodologies that are being
used by the agents rather than from a list of reason-
able sounding requirements. Another objection is that
their argument relies on strong Dutch Book coherence,
which is a strengthening of the usual Dutch Book coher-
ence that subjective Bayesians use to derive the structure
of classical probability theory. Strong coherence entails
that if an agent assigns probability one to an event then
she must be certain that it will occur. This is obviously
problematic in the case of infinite sample spaces due to
the presence of sets of measure zero and, since there is
nothing in the Dutch Book argument that singles out fi-
nite sample spaces, it would not usually be accepted by
subjective Bayesians in that case either.
Since CFS do not believe that the BFM criterion is
a uniquely compelling requirement, they also introduce
a number of weaker compatibility criteria based on the
compatibility of the probability distributions obtained by
making different types of measurement on the system.
Three of these compatibility criteria are equivalent to the
usual intersecting support criterion in the classical case,
but they become inequivalent when applied to quantum
theory. Presumably, this is supposed to cast doubt upon
the uniqueness of BFM as a compelling compatibility cri-
terion in the quantum case. However, in our view, the
non-BFM criteria in the CFS hierarchy are not mean-
ingful as compatibility criteria. To explain why, we take
their weakest criterion — W ′ compatibility — as an ex-
ample.
The W ′ criterion says that two quantum states are
compatible if there exists a measurement for which the
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Born rule outcome probability distributions computed
from the two states are compatible in the classical sense,
i.e. they have intersecting support in the set of outcomes.
It is fairly easy to see that this places no constraint at all
on state assignments — such a measurement can always
be found. For example, if Wanda and Theo assign two
orthogonal pure states then a measurement in a comple-
mentary basis would always yield compatible probability
distributions over the set of outcomes. CFS argue that
Wanda and Theo could resolve their differences empir-
ically by making such a measurement in this scenario.
After the measurement, if both Wanda and Theo learn
the outcome and apply the projection postulate, then
they would end up assigning the same state to the sys-
tem, specifically, the state in the complementary basis
corresponding to the outcome that was observed.
However, in our view, this does not resolve the origi-
nal conflict between Wanda and Theo. Although Wanda
and Theo’s state assignments to the region after the mea-
surement (its quantum output) are now identical, their
state assignments to the region before the measurement
(its quantum input) remain unchanged. As stated in
§III A, and explained in more detail in [1], the state of
the region before the measurement updates via quantum
Bayesian conditioning rather than by the projection pos-
tulate. Pure states are fixed points of quantum Bayesian
conditioning, so Wanda and Theo will always continue
to disagree about the state of this region, whatever in-
formation they later acquire about the region.
The mistake that CFS have made is to think of compat-
ibility in terms of persistent systems rather than spatio-
temporal regions, and to think of the projection postu-
late as a quantum analogue of Bayesian conditioning. It
is easy to make this mistake because in a classical the-
ory of Bayesian inference, a measurement can be non-
disturbing. In this case, the value of the variable Y be-
ing measured is not changed by the measurement, and
the update rule for the probability distribution of Y can
be understood as conditioning Y on the outcome of the
measurement. The variable describing the system be-
fore the measurement is the same as the one describing
it after, so that updating your beliefs about one is the
same as updating your beliefs about the other. But this
is no longer true for classical measurements that disturb
the system, and as argued in [1], all nontrivial quantum
measurements are analogous to these. Therefore, to high-
light the problem with theW ′ compatibility criterion, we
consider what it would predict in the case of a disturbing
classical measurement.
Suppose the system is a coin that has just been flipped,
but is currently hidden from Wanda and Theo. If Wanda
believes that the coin has definitely landed heads and
Theo believes that it has definitely landed tails, then
their beliefs are certainly incompatible. If the coin is
then flipped again and Wanda and Theo are shown the
outcome of the second toss, they will agree on the cur-
rent state of the coin, and hence their state assignments
to the system after the observation are now compatible.
However, because the configuration of the coin was dis-
turbed in the process of measurement, there is no sense in
which their disagreement about the outcome of the first
coin flip has been resolved. Similarly, we believe that
because nontrivial quantum measurements always entail
a disturbance (in the sense described in [1]), coming to
agreement about the state of the region after the mea-
surement does not resolve a disagreement about the state
of the region before the measurement.
Despite our reservations about the CFS compatibility
criteria, they are still of some independent interest. In
particular, one of them (the PP criterion) was recently
used in a quite different context as part of a no-go theo-
rem for certain types of hidden variable models for quan-
tum theory [46].
V. INTERMEZZO: CONDITIONAL
INDEPENDENCE AND SUFFICIENCY
Having dealt with state compatibility, our next task
is to develop a Bayesian approach to combining state
assignments. In order to do this, two additional con-
cepts are needed: conditional independence and sufficient
statistics, which are reviewed in this section. Quantum
conditional independence has been studied in [40], from
which we quote results without proof.
A. Conditional independence
1. Classical conditional independence
A pair of random variables R and S are conditionally
independent given another random variable T if they sat-
isfy any of the following equivalent conditions:
CI1: P (S|R, T ) = P (S|T )
CI2: P (R|S, T ) = P (R|T )
CI3: I(R : S|T ) = 0
CI4: P (R,S|T ) = P (R|T )P (S|T ),
where it is left implicit that these equations only have
to hold for those values of the variables for which the
conditionals are well-defined. Here, I(R : S|T ) is the
conditional mutual information of R and S given T , de-
fined by
I(R : S|T ) = H(R, T ) +H(S, T )
−H(T )−H(R,S, T ), (50)
where H(R) = −
∑
r P (R = r) log2 P (R = r) is the
Shannon entropy of R, with the obvious generalization
to multiple variables. Note that the conditional mutual
information is always positive.
Conditional independence of R and S given T means
that any correlations between R and S are mediated, or
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screened-off, by T . In other words, if one were to learn
the value of T then R and S would become independent.
2. Quantum conditional independence for acausally related
regions
In the quantum case, the three random variables R, S
and T become quantum regions with Hilbert spaces HA,
HB and HC . We specialize to the case of three acausally
related regions because the theory of conditional indepen-
dence has not yet been developed for other causal scenar-
ios. Prior to the introduction of conditional states, it was
not obvious whether the conditional independence condi-
tions CI1, CI2 and CI4 had quantum analogs, but CI3
has a straightforward generalization where I(A : B|C) is
now the quantum conditional mutual information defined
as
I(A : B|C) = S(A,C) + S(B,C)
− S(C)− S(A,B,C), (51)
where S(A) = −TrA (ρA log ρA) is the von Neumann
entropy of the state on A. The quantum conditional
mutual information satisfies I(A : B|C) ≥ 0, which is
equivalent to the strong sub-additivity inequality [47],
and so the quantum conditional independence condition
I(A : B|C) = 0 is the equality condition for strong sub-
additivity.
In the conditional states formalism, there are direct
analogs of the conditions CI1 and CI2 that provide an
alternative characterization of quantum conditional in-
dependence.
Theorem V.1. For three acausally related regions, A,
B and C, the following conditions are equivalent:
QCI1: ρA|BC = ρA|C
QCI2: ρB|AC = ρB|C
QCI3: I(A : B|C) = 0
Due to these equivalences, any of QCI1–QCI3 can be
viewed as the definition of quantum conditional indepen-
dence.
It is also true that
Theorem V.2. If A is conditionally independent of B
given C, then
QCI4: ρAB|C = ρA|CρB|C.
Because ρAB|C is self-adjoint, theorem V.2 implies that
ρA|C and ρB|C must commute when A and B are con-
ditionally independent given C. Unlike in the classical
case, the converse of theorem V.2 does not hold, i.e.
ρAB|C = ρA|CρB|C does not imply conditional indepen-
dence. Extra constraints on the form of ρC can be im-
posed to yield equivalence, but these are not important
for present purposes (see [40] for details).
3. Hybrid conditional independence
The case that is most relevant to the present work is
when two classical random variables X1 and X2 are con-
ditionally independent given a quantum region B. The
proofs of theorems V.1 and V.2 only depend on the exis-
tence of a joint state (positive, normalized, density opera-
tor) for the three regions under consideration. Therefore,
if we specialize to causal scenarios in which a joint state
ρBX1X2 can be assigned, as discussed in §III B, then the
definitions QCI1–QCI3 can now be applied in any of
these causal scenarios by substituting X1 for A, X2 for
B and B for C. The consequence QCI4 also applies to
this case.
B. Sufficient statistics
The idea of a sufficient statistic can be motivated by a
typical example problem in statistics: estimating the bias
of a coin from a sequence of coin flips that are judged to
be independent and identically distributed. In this prob-
lem, only the relative frequency of occurrence of heads
and tails in the sequence is relevant to the bias, whilst the
exact ordering of heads and tails is irrelevant. The rela-
tive frequency is then an example of a sufficient statistic
for the sequence with respect to the bias. In this section,
this notion is generalized to the hybrid case wherein the
classical parameter to be estimated is replaced by a quan-
tum region, but the data is still classical, i.e. this section
concerns sufficient statistics for classical data with re-
spect to a quantum region. Note that quantum sufficient
statistics have been considered before in the literature
[41–43], but these works are somewhat orthogonal to the
present treatment because they concern sufficiency of a
quantum system with respect to classical measurement
data [42, 43], or the sufficiency of measurement data with
respect to preparation data [41].
1. Classical sufficient statistics
Suppose a parameter, represented by a random vari-
able Y , is to be estimated from data, represented by a
random variable X .
Definition V.3. A sufficient statistic forX with respect
to Y is a function t of the values of X such that the
random variable t(X) satisfies
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = P (Y |X = x), (52)
for all x such that P (X = x) 6= 0.
A sufficient statistic for X is a way of processing X
such that the result is just as informative about Y as X
is. In other words, learning the value of the processed
variable t(X) allows an agent to make all the same infer-
ences about Y that they could have made by learning the
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value of X itself. Such processings are coarse-grainings
of the values of X , which discard information about X ,
but only information that is not relevant for making in-
ferences about Y .
Since t(X) is just a function of X , it is immediate that
Y is conditionally independent of t(X) given X , i.e.
P (Y |X, t(X)) = P (Y |X), (53)
This follows from the fact that we can write the joint dis-
tribution as P (Y,X, t(X)) = P (t(X)|X)P (Y X) (where
P (t(X) = a|X = x) = δa,t(x)). Moreover, the sufficiency
condition, eq. (52), implies that it is also true that Y is
conditionally independent of X given t(X), i.e.
P (Y |X, t(X)) = P (Y |t(X)). (54)
This is a consequence of the fact that the joint dis-
tribution can also be written as P (Y,X, t(X)) =
P (t(X)|X)P (Y |t(X))P (X), where we have used eq. (52).
Definition V.4. A minimal sufficient statistic for X
with respect to Y is a sufficient statistic that can be writ-
ten as a function of any other sufficient statistic for X
with respect to Y .
A minimal sufficient statistic for X with respect to
Y contains only that information about X that is rele-
vant for making inferences about Y . Clearly, a sufficient
statistic t is minimal iff
t(x) = t(x′) ⇔ P (Y |X = x) = P (Y |X = x′). (55)
The following lemma is used repeatedly in our discus-
sion of combining quantum states.
Lemma V.5. Let P (X,Y ) be a probability distribution
over two random variables and let t(x) = P (Y |X = x),
i.e. t is a statistic for X that takes functions of Y for
its values. Then, t is a minimal sufficient statistic for X
with respect to Y and
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = t(x). (56)
Proof. Clearly t satisfies eq. (55) because t(x) is equal to
P (Y |X = x) in this case. It is therefore minimally suffi-
cient. By the conditional version of belief propagation
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =∑
x′
P (Y |X = x′, t(X) = t(x))P (X = x′|t(X) = t(x)).
(57)
Since t is a sufficient statistic, A is conditionally inde-
pendent of t(X) given X , so this reduces to
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =∑
x′
P (Y |X = x′)P (X = x′|t(X) = t(x)). (58)
The term P (X = x′|t(X) = t(x)) is only nonzero for
those values x′ such that t(x′) = t(x) and all such values
satisfy P (Y |X = x′) = P (Y |X = x). Therefore,
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) =
P (Y |X = x)
∑
{x′|t(x′)=t(x)}
P (X = x′|t(X) = t(x)). (59)
However,
∑
{x′|t(x′)=t(x)} P (X = x
′|t(X) = t(x)) =∑
x′ P (X = x
′|t(X) = t(x)) = 1, since P (X = x′|t(X) =
t(x)) is zero when t(x′) 6= t(x) and it is a conditional
probability distribution. Hence,
P (Y |t(X) = t(x)) = P (Y |X = x) (60)
= t(x). (61)
Eq. (56) looks superficially similar to Lewis’ Principal
Principle [48], which states that when you know that the
objective chance of an event takes a particular value then
you should assign that value as your subjective probabil-
ity for that event. However, eq. (56) is not a statement
about objective chances. Its interpretation is entirely in
terms of subjective probabilities. Suppose P (X,Y ) is
your subjective probability distribution for X and Y and
you announce this to me. I then go and observe X , find-
ing that it has the value x. If I then tell you that the
subjective probability distribution that you would assign
to Y if you knew the value of X that I have observed is
Q(Y ), and you believe that I am being honest, i.e. that I
have computed Q(Y ) = P (Y |X = x) from your subjec-
tive probability distribution and this is what I am report-
ing back to you, then you have learned that t(X) = Q
and eq. (56) says that your posterior probability distri-
bution for Y should now be Q(Y ).
2. Hybrid sufficient statistics
Recall that if XB is a hybrid region then conditional
density operators ρB|X are of the form
ρB|X =
∑
x
|x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρB|X=x, (62)
where the operators ρB|X=x are normalized density op-
erators on HB . As in the classical case, the idea of suffi-
ciency is to find a statistic for X with fewer values than
X that still allows the conditional density operator to be
reconstructed. In order to do this, it is only necessary
to know which density operator ρB|X=x a value of X
corresponds to, and there may be fewer distinct density
operators than values of X . This motivates the following
definition.
Definition V.6. A sufficient statistic forX with respect
to the quantum region B is a function t of the values of
X such that the random variable t(X) satisfies
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = ρB|X=x, (63)
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for all x such that ρX=x 6= 0.
This definition captures the notion that learning the
value of the processed variable t(X) allows an agent to
make all the same inferences about the quantum region
B that they could have made by learning the value of X
itself.
Since t(X) is just a classical processing of X (specif-
ically, ρt(X)=a|X=x = δa,t(x)), we can introduce a joint
state on the composite system BXt(X) as discussed in
§III B via
ρBXt(X) = ρt(X)|XρBX , (64)
As one can easily verify, this state satisfies the analogous
conditional independence relations to those that hold in
the classical case. Specifically, B and t(X) are condition-
ally independent given X ,
ρB|Xt(X) = ρB|X , (65)
and because t(X) is a sufficient statistic for X with re-
spect to B, it is also the case that B and X are condi-
tionally independent given t(X),
ρB|Xt(X) = ρB|t(X), (66)
as can be seen by noting that the joint state can also be
written as ρBXt(X) = ρt(X)|XρB|t(X)ρX if one makes use
of eq. (63).
Definition V.7. A minimal sufficient statistic for X
with respect to a quantum regionB is a sufficient statistic
that can be written as a function of any other sufficient
statistic for X with respect to a quantum region B.
It follows that minimal sufficiency is equivalent to
t(x) = t(x′) ⇔ ρB|X=x = ρB|X=x′ . (67)
We will also need an analog of lemma V.5.
Lemma V.8. Let ρXB be the state of a hybrid region
XB and let t(x) = ρB|X=x, i.e. t is a statistic for X that
takes quantum states on B for its values. Then, t is a
minimal sufficient statistic for X with respect to B and
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = t(x). (68)
Proof. The statistic t satisfies eq. (67) because t(x) is
equal to ρB|X=x. It is therefore minimally sufficient. By
the conditional version of belief propagation
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = TrX
(
ρB|Xt(X)=xρX|t(X)=t(x)
)
. (69)
Since t is a sufficient statistic, B is conditionally inde-
pendent of t(X) given X , so this reduces to
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = TrX
(
ρB|XρX|t(X)=t(x)
)
. (70)
However, ρX=x′|t(X)=t(x) is only nonzero for those val-
ues x′ such that t(x′) = t(x) and all such values satisfy
ρB|X=x′ = ρB|X=x. Therefore,
ρB|t(X)=t(x) =
ρB|X=x
∑
{x′|t(x′)=t(x)}
ρX=x′|t(X)=t(x). (71)
However,
∑
{x′|t(x′)=t(x)} ρX=x′|t(X)=t(x) =
TrX
(
ρX|t(X)=t(x)
)
= 1, since ρX=x′|t(X)=t(x) is zero
when t(x′) 6= t(x) and ρX|t(X) is a conditional state.
Hence,
ρB|t(X)=t(x) = ρB|X=x (72)
= t(x). (73)
VI. QUANTUM STATE IMPROVEMENT
State improvement is the task of updating your state
assignment in the light of learning another agent’s state
assignment. It is the simplest example of a procedure
for combining different states. We adopt the approach
of treating the other agent’s state assignment as data
and conditioning on it. In the classical case, this idea is
usually attributed to Morris [49].
A. General methodology for state improvement
Classically, suppose a decision maker, Debbie, assigns
a prior state P0(Y ) to the variable of interest, Y . Debbie
may have little or no specialist knowledge about Y , in
which case her prior would be something like a uniform
distribution. In order to improve the quality of her de-
cision, she consults an expert, Wanda, who reports her
opinion in the form of a state Q1(Y ). Assuming that
Debbie does not have the expertise to assess the data
and arguments by which Wanda arrived at her state as-
signment, the summary Q1(Y ) is all she has to go on.
In order to improve her state assignment by Bayesian
conditioning, Debbie has to treat Wanda’s state assign-
ment as data. This means that she has to construct a
likelihood function P0(R|Y ), where R is a random vari-
able that ranges over all the possible state assignments
that Wanda might report. Since R ranges over a space
of functions, there may be technical difficulties in defin-
ing a sample space for it, but in practice R can usually
be confined to well parameterized families of states, e.g.
Gaussian states or a finite set of choices. In assigning
her likelihood function, Debbie has to take into account
factors such as Wanda’s trustworthiness, her accuracy
in making previous predictions, and so forth. Assuming
that Debbie can do this, she can then update her prior
state via Bayes’ theorem to obtain
P0(Y |R = Q1) =
P0(R = Q1|Y )P0(Y )
P0(R = Q1)
. (74)
where P0(R = Q1) =
∑
Y P0(R = Q1|Y )P0(Y ).
Turning to the quantum case, the situation is precisely
the same except that we are now dealing with hybrid
regions and the quantum Bayes’ theorem. Specifically,
Debbie is now interested in a quantum region B, to which
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she assigns a prior state ρ
(0)
B , and Wanda announces her
expert state assignment σ
(1)
B . Debbie treats Wanda’s an-
nouncement as data and constructs a classical random
variable R that takes Wanda’s possible state assignments
as values. Constructing a sample space for all possi-
ble states is again technically subtle, but in practice at-
tention can be restricted to well-parameterized families.
Debbie’s likelihood is now a hybrid conditional state ρ
(0)
R|B
and she updates her prior state assignment via the hybrid
Bayes’ theorem to give
ρ
(0)
B|R=σ(1)
B
= ρ
(0)
R=σ
(1)
B
|B ⋆
(
ρ
(0)
B
[
ρ
(0)
R=σ
(1)
B
]−1)
. (75)
where ρ
(0)
R=σ
(1)
B
= TrB
(
ρ
(0)
R=σ
(1)
B
|Bρ
(0)
B
)
.
Note that the same methodology can be applied when
Debbie consults more than one expert: Wanda, Theo,
etc. Debbie simply has to construct a likelihood func-
tion P (R1, R2, . . . |Y ) in the classical case or a likelihood
operator ρR1R2,...|B in the quantum case, where R1 rep-
resents Wanda’s state assignment, R2 represents Theo’s
state assignment, etc. She then applies the appropriate
version of Bayes’ theorem to condition on the state as-
signments that the experts announce. This procedure is
used in our approach to the pooling problem, discussed
in §VII.
B. The case of shared priors
Eqs. (74) and (75) are the general rules that Debbie
should use to improve her state assignment, but in prac-
tice it can be difficult to determine the likelihoods for
R needed to apply them. However, the rules can sim-
plify drastically in some situations. In particular, if Deb-
bie and Wanda started with a shared prior for Y or B,
Wanda’s state differs from Debbie’s due to having col-
lected more data, and Debbie is willing to trust Wanda’s
data analysis, then the rules imply that Debbie should
just adopt Wanda’s state assignment wholesale.
Note that, in both the objective and subjective ap-
proaches, starting out with shared priors is an ideal-
ization. In the objective approach this is because it is
unlikely that Debbie and Wanda have exactly the same
knowledge about the region of interest, and in the sub-
jective approach this is because their prior beliefs might
simply be different. Nevertheless, in the objective ap-
proach we can always imagine a (possibly hypothetical)
time in the past at which Debbie and Wanda had exactly
the same knowledge and, provided Debbie’s knowledge is
a subset of Wanda’s current knowledge, the result still
follows. This argument does not apply in the subjective
case, but there are still circumstances in which the ideal
of shared priors is a good approximation.
Consider first the classical case. Debbie and Wanda
share a prior state assignment P0(Y ) = P1(Y ) = P (Y )
for the variable of interest. Wanda then obtains some
extra data in the form of the value x of some random
variable X that is correlated with Y . Before learning the
value of X , Wanda adopts a likelihood model for it, given
by conditional probabilities P (X |Y ), and we assume that
Debbie agrees with this likelihood model. Upon acquir-
ing the value x of X , Wanda updates her probabilities
to Q1(Y ) = P (Y |X = x), which can be computed from
Bayes’ theorem, and then she reports Q1(Y ) to Debbie.
In other words, Debbie learns that R = Q1 and she must
condition on this data to obtain her improved state as-
signment P (Y |R = Q1).
Proposition VI.1. If Debbie and Wanda share a prior
state assignment P (Y ) and likelihood model P (X |Y ) for
the data collected by Wanda, then Debbie’s improved
state is P (Y |R = Q1) = Q1(Y ), where Q1(Y ) is Wanda’s
updated state assignment.
Proof. Because Debbie and Wanda have a shared prior
and likelihood assignment, the variable R is simply
R(x) = P (Y |X = x), where P (Y |X = x) is the prob-
ability distribution that Debbie would assign if she knew
the value of X . Lemma V.5 then implies that P (Y |R =
Q1) = Q1.
Note that Aumann [50] has argued that there is a
unique posterior that objective Bayesians ought to as-
sign when their state assignments are common knowl-
edge. The above theorem is a special case of this in which
the unique state can be easily computed.
In the quantum case, the argument proceeds in precise
analogy. Debbie and Wanda start with a shared prior
state ρB for region B. Wanda announces her state as-
signment σ
(1)
B , which can be represented as the result of
conditioning B on the value x of a random variable X ,
i.e. σ
(1)
B = ρB|X=x. We assume that Debbie and Wanda
agree upon the likelihood operator ρX|B for X . Debbie
then has to compute her improved state ρ
B|R=σ(1)
B
.
Proposition VI.2. If Debbie and Wanda share a prior
state assignment ρB and likelihood operator ρX|B for the
data collected by Wanda, then Debbie’s improved state is
ρ
B|R=σ(1)
B
= σ
(1)
B , where σ
(1)
B is Wanda’s updated state
assignment.
The proof is just the obvious generalization of the proof
of theorem VI.1, making use of lemma V.8 instead of
lemma V.5.
C. Discussion
Although our results show that state improvement is
trivial in the case of shared priors, eqs. (74) and (75)
are still applicable when Debbie and Wanda do not share
prior states and, in that case, they give nontrivial results.
The analysis of such cases is a lot more involved, so we
do not consider any examples here.
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In the classical case, the general methodology leading
to eq. (74) can be criticized. It is an onerous require-
ment for Debbie to be able to articulate a likelihood for
all possible state assignments that Wanda might make.
This criticism is mitigated by the shared priors result,
which shows that, at least in this case, the likelihood
model need not be specified in detail. Such simplifica-
tions might also occur in other models that do not de-
pend on shared priors. In any case, this criticism is not
particularly unique to state improvement, since it can
be leveled at Bayesian methodology in general. It is al-
ways a heavy requirement for an agent to specify a full
probability distribution over all the variables of interest.
For this reason, alternative Bayesian theories have been
developed with less onerous requirements, such as the re-
quirement to specify expectation values rather than full
probability distributions [19, 20, 51].
A criticism that is more specific to state improvement
is that the beliefs that Debbie uses to determine P0(Y )
might be correlated with the beliefs that she uses to de-
termine the likelihood P0(R|Y ), e.g. Debbie might be
biased towards believing that Wanda will report states
that are concentrated on values of Y that Debbie her-
self believes are likely. A generalization that takes these
correlations into account has been proposed [52].
Every criticism leveled against the classical methodol-
ogy also applies to the quantum case and, no doubt, the
proposed classical generalizations could be raised to the
quantum level by applying the methods outlined in this
paper. This is not done here because it is not our goal to
say the final word on quantum state improvement, but
only to point out that there is no need to reinvent the
wheel when studying the quantum case because classical
methods can be easily adapted using the formalism of
conditional states.
Finally, note that quantum state improvement has pre-
viously been considered by Herbut [34], who adopted
an ad hoc procedure based on closeness of Debbie and
Wanda’s states with respect to Hilbert-Schmidt distance.
It would be interesting to see if Herbut’s rule can be
derived using Bayesian methodology under a set of rea-
sonable assumptions that Debbie could make about how
Wanda arrived at her state assignment.
VII. QUANTUM STATE POOLING
The problem of state pooling concerns what happens
when agents who each have their own state assignments
want to make decisions as a group. To do so, they need to
come up with a state assignment that accurately reflects
the views of the group as a whole.
In an ideal world, the agents would first reconcile
their differences empirically so that everyone agrees on a
common state assignment. The discussion of subjective
Bayesian compatibility shows that it is possible for this
to happen if their states satisfy the BFM compatibility
criterion. Furthermore, as a consequence of the classical
and quantum de Finetti theorems [18, 20, 53, 54], if the
agents can construct an exchangeable sequence of experi-
ments then their states can be expected to converge in the
long run by application of Bayesian conditioning. Nev-
ertheless, it is not always possible to collect more data
before a decision has to be made and, for the subjective
Bayesian, there is also the question of how to combine
sharply contradictory beliefs that do not satisfy compat-
ibility criteria in the first place.
The goal of this section is to provide a general method-
ology for quantum pooling based on applying the prin-
ciples of quantum Bayesian inference, similar to the ap-
proach to state improvement developed in §VI. In the
case of shared priors, we also derive a specific pooling rule
from this methodology that was previously proposed by
Spekkens and Wiseman [10]. However, before embarking
upon this discussion, it is useful to take a step back and
look at the basic requirements for pooling and some of
the specific pooling rules that have been proposed in the
classical case.
A. Review of pooling rules
One reasonable requirement for a pooling rule is that
the pooled state should be compatible with each agent’s
individual state assignment. If this is so then each agent
is assured that it is possible for them to be vindicated by
future observations. This is because subjective Bayesian
compatibility guarantees that, for each agent, it is pos-
sible that data could be collected that would cause the
pooled state and the agent’s individual state to become
identical upon Bayesian conditioning.
Consider the classical case where n agents assign states
Q1(Y ), Q2(Y ), . . .Qn(Y ) to a random variable Y . A lin-
ear opinion pool is a rule where the pooled state Qlin is
of the form
Qlin(Y ) =
n∑
j=1
wjQj(Y ), (76)
where 0 < wj < 1 and
∑n
j=1 wj = 1. The weight wj can
be thought of as a measure of the amount of trust that
the group assigns to the jth agent. The state Qlin(Y )
is BFM compatible with every Qj(Y ) because eq. (76)
is an ensemble decomposition of Qlin(Y ) in which each
agent’s state appears. A linear opinion pool is typically
less sharply peaked than the individual agents’ assign-
ments. In particular its entropy cannot be lower than
that of the lowest entropy individual state. It may be ap-
propriate to use it as a diplomatic solution. Indeed, this
sort of pooling rule may be applied even if the agents’
state assignments are not pairwise compatible.
Linear opinion pools can be straightforwardly general-
ized to the quantum case. Specifically, if n agents assign
states σ
(1)
B , σ
(2)
B , . . . σ
(n)
B to a quantum region B, then a
quantum linear opinion pool is a rule where the pooled
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state σ
(lin)
B is of the form
σ
(lin)
B =
n∑
j=1
wjσ
(j)
B , (77)
where 0 < wj < 1 and
∑n
j=1 wj = 1. Similar remarks
apply to this as to the classical case.
Classically a multiplicative opinion pool [62] is a rule
whereby the pooled state is of the form
Qmult(Y ) = c
n∏
j=1
Qj(Y )
wj , (78)
where c is a normalization constant,
c =
1∑
Y
∏n
j=1Qj(Y )
wj
. (79)
Multiplicative pools typically result in a pooled state that
is more sharply peaked than any of the individual agent’s
states. Normalizability implies that multiplicative pools
can only be applied to states that are jointly compatible,
meaning that there is at least one value y of Y such that
Qj(Y = y) > 0 for all j. Any such value has nonzero
weight in Qmult(Y ), which guarantees that Qmult(Y ) is
compatible with every agent’s individual assignment. As
shown below, a multiplicative pool may be appropriate
in an objective Bayesian framework where all the agents
start with a shared uniform prior and the differences in
their state assignments result from having collected dif-
ferent data.
In order to account for the case where the shared prior
is not uniform, the multiplicative pool has to be general-
ized to
Qgmult(Y ) = c
n∏
j=0
Qj(Y )
wj , (80)
where the extra state Q0(Y ) represents the shared prior
information.
Unlike with linear pools, it is not immediately obvious
how to generalize multiplicative pools to the quantum
case because the product of states in eq. (80) does not
have a unique generalization due to non-commutativity.
B. General methodology for state pooling
As with the other problems tackled in this paper, pool-
ing rules should be derived in a principled way from
the rules of Bayesian inference, rather than simply be-
ing posited. One way to do this to adopt the supra-
Bayesian approach. This works by requiring the group
of agents to put themselves in the shoes of Debbie the
decision maker who we met in the state improvement
section. Specifically, in the classical case, acting to-
gether, they are asked to come up with a likelihood
function P0(R1, R2, . . . , Rn|Y ) that they think a neutral
decision maker (Debbie the supra-Bayesian) would as-
sign, where Rj is a random variable that ranges over
all possible state assignments that the jth agent might
make; and a prior P0(Y ), which can often just be taken
to be the uniform distribution or a shared prior that
the agents may have agreed upon at some point in the
past before their opinions diverged. They can then up-
date P0(Y ) to P0(Y |R1 = Q1, R2 = Q2, . . . , Rn = Qn)
via Bayesian conditioning and use this as the pooled
state Qsupra(Y ). Pooling then becomes just an appli-
cation of the state improvement method discussed in
the previous section. In the quantum case, the equiv-
alent ingredients are a hybrid likelihood ρ
(0)
R1R2...Rn|B and
a prior quantum state ρ
(0)
B , and then the pooled state
is σ
(supra)
B = ρ
(0)
B|R1=σ(1)B ,R2=σ
(2)
B ,...,Rn=σ
(n)
B
, which can be
computed from quantum Bayesian conditioning.
Admittedly, it might be a pretty tall order to expect
the agents to be able to act together as a fictional supra-
Bayesian Debbie, but this method does allow conditions
under which the different pooling rules should be used
to be derived rigorously, which in turn gives insight into
when they might be useful as rules-of-thumb more gen-
erally. It also has the advantage that it allows quantum
generalizations to be derived unambiguously, since the
necessary tools of quantum Bayesian inference have been
developed in [1] and the preceding sections. In particular,
it resolves the ambiguity surrounding the correct quan-
tum generalization of the multiplicative opinion pool.
To illustrate this, we show that, in the case of shared
priors, the supra-Bayesian approach can be used to moti-
vate the two-agent case of the quantum generalized mul-
tiplicative pool with w0 = −1, w1 = 1, w2 = 1.
C. The case of shared priors
For simplicity, we specialize to the case of a group of
two agents, Wanda and Theo. First consider the clas-
sical case where Wanda and Theo have individual state
assignments Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ). We assume that Wanda
and Theo started from a shared prior P (Y ), which can
be used as Debbie’s prior P0(Y ) = P (Y ) in the supra-
Bayesian approach, and that the current differences in
Wanda and Theo’s state assignments are due to hav-
ing collected different data. The additional data avail-
able to Wanda and Theo are modeled as values x1 and
x2 of random variables X1 and X2 respectively. Before
learning the values of X1 and X2, Wanda and Theo
assigned likelihood functions P (X1|Y ) and P (X2|Y ),
which, when combined with the prior P (Y ), determine
their current state assignments via Bayes’ theorem, i.e.
Qj(Y ) = P (Y |Xj = xj).
We assume that it is possible to assign a joint likelihood
function P (X1, X2|Y ), such that P (X1|Y ) and P (X2|Y )
are obtained by marginalization. It is unrealistic to think
that Wanda and Theo must specify this joint likelihood
in detail. Fortunately, in order to obtain a generalized
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multiplicative pool, they need only agree on some of its
broad features. In particular, if they agree that minimal
sufficient statistics for X1 and X2 are conditionally inde-
pendent given Y , then supra-Bayesian pooling gives rise
to a generalized multiplicative pool.
Theorem VII.1. If a minimal sufficient statistic for
X1 with respect to Y and a minimal sufficient statis-
tic for X2 with respect to Y are conditionally inde-
pendent given Y , then the supra-Bayesian pooled state
Qsupra(Y ) = P0(Y |R1 = Q1, R2 = Q2) is given by
Qsupra(Y ) = c
Q1(Y )Q2(Y )
P (Y )
, (81)
where c is a normalization factor, independent of Y .
Comparing this result with eq. (80) shows that this
is a generalized multiplicative pool with Q0(Y ) = P (Y ),
w0 = −1, w1 = 1 and w2 = 1. In the special case of a
uniform prior, this reduces to
Qsupra(Y ) = c
′Q1(Y )Q2(Y ), (82)
where c′ is a different normalization constant. This is a
multiplicative pool with w1 = 1 and w2 = 1.
Proof of theorem VII.1. By definition, the supra-
Bayesian pooled state is Qsupra(Y ) = P (Y |R1 =
Q1, R2 = Q2) and this can be computed from the prior
P (Y ) and the likelihood P (R1, R2|Y ) via Bayes’ theo-
rem. Now, Rj can be thought of as a function-valued
statistic for Xj via Rj(xj) = P (Y |Xj = xj). It is a
minimal sufficient statistic with respect to Y because
Rj(xj) = Rj(x
′
j) iff P (Y |Xj = xj) = P (Y |Xj = x
′
j).
By assumption, there exist minimal sufficient statistics
for X1 and for X2 that are conditionally independent
given Y . However, any minimal sufficient statistic is a
bijective function of any other minimal sufficient statistic
for the same variable, so if any pair of such statistics are
conditionally independent then they all are. Therefore,
R1 and R2 are conditionally independent given Y , and
so by CI4:
P (R1, R2|Y ) = P (R1|Y )P (R2|Y ). (83)
The terms P (Rj |Y ) can be inverted via Bayes’ theorem
to obtain P (Rj |Y ) = P (Y |Rj)P (Rj)/P (Y ), which gives
P (R1, R2|Y ) = P (R1)P (R2)
P (Y |R1)P (Y |R2)
P (Y )2
. (84)
Using Bayes’ theorem again in the form P (Y |R1, R2) =
P (R1, R2|Y )P (Y )/P (R1, R2) gives
P (Y |R1, R2) =
P (R1)P (R2)
P (R1, R2)
P (Y |R1)P (Y |R2)
P (Y )
, (85)
which, upon substituting the announced values of R1 and
R2, gives
Qsupra(Y ) =
P (R1 = Q1)P (R2 = Q2)
P (R1 = Q1, R2 = Q2)
×
P (Y |R1 = Q1)P (Y |R2 = Q2)
P (Y )
. (86)
The term c = [P (R1 = Q1)P (R2 = Q2)] /P (R1 =
Q1, R2 = Q2) is independent of Y , so it can
be determined from the normalization constraint∑
Y Qsupra(Y ) = 1. Also, lemma V.5 implies P (Y |Rj =
Qj) = Qj(Y ), so we have
Qsupra(Y ) = c
Q1(Y )Q2(Y )
P (Y )
, (87)
as required.
In the quantum case, Wanda and Theo have individual
state assignments σ
(1)
B and σ
(2)
B . Again, any differences
in Wanda and Theo’s state assignments are assumed to
arise from having collected different data, before which
they agreed upon a shared prior ρB, which can be used
as Debbie’s prior state ρ
(0)
B = ρB in the supra-Bayesian
approach.
Again, we assume that Wanda and Theo have ob-
served values x1 and x2 of random variables X1 and X2,
with likelihood operators, ρX1|B and ρX2|B. Wanda and
Theo’s states result from conditioning the shared prior
on their data using these likelihoods. We assume that
there is a joint likelihood ρX1X2|B, of which Wanda and
Theo’s likelihoods are marginals. Wanda and Theo need
not agree on the full details of this joint likelihood, only
that minimal sufficient statistics for X1 and X2 satisfy
QCI4, which is slightly weaker than conditional inde-
pendence. We then have
Theorem VII.2. If a minimal sufficient statistic t1 for
X1 with respect to B and a minimal sufficient statistic t2
for X2 with respect to B satisfy
ρt1(X1)t2(X2)|B = ρt1(X1)|Bρt2(X2)|B, (88)
then the supra-Bayesian pooled state σ
(supra)
B =
σ
(0)
B|R1=σ(1)B ,R2=σ
(2)
B
is given by
σ
(supra)
B = cσ
(1)
B ρ
−1
B σ
(2)
B (89)
where c is a normalization factor, independent of B.
Eq. (89) is the quantum generalization of the general-
ized multiplicative pool with w0 = −1, w1 = 1, w2 = 1.
Despite appearances, this expression is symmetric under
exchange of 1 and 2. This follows from the condition (88),
which implies that ρt1(X1)|B and ρt2(X2)|B must commute.
When ρB is a maximally mixed state, eq. (89) reduces to
σ
(supra)
B = c
′σ(1)B σ
(2)
B , (90)
where c′ is a different normalization constant. This is a
quantum generalization of the multiplicative pool with
w1 = 1, w2 = 1.
Although conditional independence of the minimal
sufficient statistics was assumed in the classical case,
eq. (88) is strictly weaker than conditional independence,
as explained in §VA.
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Proof of theorem VII.2. By definition, the supra-
Bayesian pooled state is σ
(supra)
B = ρB|R1=σ(1)B ,R2=σ
(2)
B
and this can be computed from the prior ρB and the
likelihood ρR1R2|B via Bayes’ theorem. Each Rj is an
operator-valued statistic for Xj via Rj(xj) = ρB|Xj=xj .
They are minimal sufficient statistics with respect to B
because Rj(xj) = Rj(x
′
j) iff ρB|Xj=xj = ρB|Xj=x′j . By
assumption, there exist minimal sufficient statistics, t1
and t2, for X1 and X2 that satisfy
ρt1(X1)t2(X2)|B = ρt1(X1)|Bρt2(X2)|B, (91)
but since any minimal sufficient statistic is a bijective
function of any other minimal sufficient statistic for the
same variable, R1 and R2 must also satisfy
ρR1R2|B = ρR1|BρR2|B. (92)
The terms ρRj |B can be inverted via Bayes’ theorem to
obtain ρRj |B = ρB|Rj ⋆
(
ρRjρ
−1
B
)
, which gives
ρR1R2|B =
[
ρB|R1 ⋆
(
ρR1ρ
−1
B
)] [
ρB|R1 ⋆
(
ρR1ρ
−1
B
)]
.
(93)
Since R1 and R2 are classical, the operators ρRj commute
with everything else and so expanding the ⋆-products
gives
ρR1R2|B = ρR1ρR2ρ
− 12
B ρB|R1ρ
−1
B ρB|R2ρ
− 12
B . (94)
Using Bayes’ theorem again in the form ρB|R1R2 =
ρR1R2|B ⋆
(
ρBρ
−1
R1R2
)
and noting that ρR1R2 commutes
with everything else gives
ρB|R1R2 = ρR1ρR2ρ
−1
R1R2
(
ρB|R1ρ
−1
B ρB|R2
)
, (95)
which, upon substituting the announced values of R1 and
R2, gives
σ
(supra)
B =
ρ
R1=σ
(1)
B
ρ
R2=σ
(2)
B
ρ
R1=σ
(1)
B
,R2=σ
(2)
B
× ρ
B|R1=σ(1)B
ρ−1B ρB|R2=σ(2)B
, (96)
The term c =
[
ρ
R1=σ
(1)
B
ρ
R2=σ
(2)
B
]
/ρ
R1=σ
(1)
B ,R2=σ
(2)
B
is in-
dependent ofB, so it can be determined from the normal-
ization constraint TrB
(
σ
(supra)
B
)
= 1. Also, lemma V.8
implies ρ
B|Rj=σ(j)B
= σ
(j)
B , so we have
σ
(supra)
B = cσ
(1)
B ρ
−1
B σ
(2)
B , (97)
as we set out to prove.
D. Comparison to other approaches
Quantum state pooling has been discussed previously
in [10, 25, 28, 38, 39]. Both [25] and [38] propose pooling
methodologies that seem ad hoc from the Bayesian point
of view, but, as with Herbut’s approach to improvement,
it would be interesting to see whether they could be jus-
tified in the supra-Bayesian approach.
Jacobs [28, 39] considers quantum state pooling in the
case where Wanda and Theo arrive at their states by
making direct measurements on the system of interest. In
particular, he derives a generalization of the multiplica-
tive rule that is distinct from the one we derive. From the
perspective of the conditional states formalism, his rule
is not a valid way of combining state assignments. The
reason is that Jacobs takes collapse rules in quantum the-
ory — such as the von Neumann-Lu¨ders-von Neumann
projection postulate or its generalization to POVMs —
as quantum versions of Bayesian conditioning, but in the
conditional states framework, such collapse rules are ex-
plicitly not instances of Bayesian conditioning, as argued
in §III A and [1].
Spekkens and Wiseman [10] consider the case of pool-
ing via remote measurements, wherein there is a shared
prior state ρBA1A2 of a tripartite system and Wanda and
Theo arrive at their differing state assignments for B by
making POVMmeasurements on A1 and A2 respectively,
as depicted in fig. 1b. They obtain the same generalized
multiplicative pool that has been derived here, namely
cσ
(1)
B ρ
−1
B σ
(2)
B , for two restricted classes of states ρBA1A2 .
Both of these classes are special cases of states for which
A1 and A2 are conditionally independent given B. If
ρBA1A2 satisfies this conditional independence then so
does any hybrid state ρBX1X2 obtained by measuring
POVMs ρX1|A1 on system A1 and ρX2|A2 on system A2.
This is because the conditional mutual information can-
not be increased by applying local CPT maps to A1 and
A2. The minimal sufficient statistics for X1 and X2 then
also satisfy conditional independence because they are
just local processings of X1 and X2. Therefore, the as-
sumptions of theorem VII.2 follow from this conditional
independence. As such, the result of [10] is seen to be a
special case of the one derived here.
What we have shown is that the Spekkens and Wise-
man pooling rule holds under much weaker conditions
than the conditional independence of A1 and A2 given
B. For example, it also holds for states of the form
ρBA′1A′2⊗ρA′′1A′′2 , whereHAj = HA′j⊗HA′′j and A
′
1 and A
′
2
are conditionally independent given B. For such states,
A1 and A2 are not conditionally independent given B
whenever ρA′′1A′′2 is a correlated state, but A
′′
1 and A
′′
2
contain no information about B, so they will not be cor-
related with the minimal sufficient statistics for X1 and
X2 and consequently the minimal sufficient statistics are
conditionally independent given B, which is sufficient to
derive the result[63]. Of course, our results also signifi-
cantly generalize those of [10] because theorem VII.2 ap-
plies to a broader set of causal scenarios than just the
remote measurement scenario.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that both Jacobs
[28, 39] and Spekkens and Wiseman [10] adopt a pooling
methodology that is less widely applicable than the one
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used in the present work. In [10], for example, a fourth
party called Oswald (the overseer) is introduced into the
game, in addition to the two agents and the decision-
maker (whom they call the pooler). Before any data is
collected, everyone shares a prior ρB for the region of
interest. In addition, Wanda, Theo and Oswald assign
a shared prior ρBX1X2 including the data variables that
Wanda and Theo are going to observe[64]. Oswald has
access to both Wanda and Theo’s data, i.e. he learns the
values x1 and x2 that Wanda and Theo observe so he
can update his state to the posterior ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 . It
is then asserted that if Oswald’s posterior can be deter-
mined from the data available to Debbie, then this is
what she should assign as the pooled state. Since Debbie
only knows Wanda and Theo’s state assignments and the
prior ρB, this is possible only if Oswald’s posterior can
be computed from these alone.
This methodology is less widely applicable than the
one presented here because it does not specify what to do
if Debbie cannot determine Oswald’s posterior, whereas
ours does. In fact, there are situations in which the mul-
tiplicative pooling rule is applicable even though Debbie
cannot determine Oswald’s posterior using the data that
she has available. Therefore, even though the rule of
adopting Oswald’s posterior if it can be determined is
indeed correct in the supra-Bayesian approach, requiring
this is an unnecessary restriction and it is better to make
do without Oswald.
It is useful to consider how such situations can
arise. By learning ρB|X1=x1 and ρB|X2=x2 , Deb-
bie learns a minimal sufficient statistic for X1 with
respect to B and a minimal sufficient statistic for
X2 with respect to B and hence Debbie’s posterior
is ρB|R1(X1)=R1(x1),R2(X2)=R2(x2), where the function
Rj(xj) = ρB|Xj=xj is the state-valued minimal suffi-
cient statistic for Xj . This is identical to Oswald’s
posterior iff (R1, R2) happens to be a sufficient statis-
tic for the pair (X1, X2) with respect to B, i.e. iff
ρB|R1(X1)=R1(x1)R2(X2)=R2(x2) = ρB|X1=x1X2=x2 . In gen-
eral, this is not the case, since it is only guaranteed that
R1 and R2 are locally sufficient for the individual data,
i.e. ρB|R1(X1)=R1(x1) = ρB|X1=x1 and ρB|R2(X2)=R2(x2) =
ρB|X2=x2 , and not globally sufficient for the pair. How-
ever, Debbie only has enough data to reconstruct Os-
wald’s posterior if they are in fact globally sufficient, that
is, if ρB|R1(X1)=R1(x1),R2(X2)=R2(x2) = ρB|X1=x1,X2=x2 .
Y 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
X1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
X2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
P (Y,X1, X2)
1
4
0 0 1
4
0 1
4
1
4
0
TABLE III: A prior state for which Debbie cannot determine
Oswald’s prior, but for which the multiplicative pooling rule
still holds
A classical example suffices to show that our pooling
rule sometimes applies even in cases where Debbie can-
not reconstruct Oswald’s posterior. Suppose Y , X1 and
X2 are classical bits and Oswald’s prior is given by ta-
ble III. With this assignment, the shared prior for Y
is P (Y = 0) = P (Y = 1) = 12 . Learning the value of
Xj on its own gives no further information about Y , i.e.
P (Y |Xj = xj) = P (Y ), independently of the value ofXj ,
so both Wanda and Theo simply report the uniform dis-
tribution back to Debbie. Any minimal sufficient statistic
for Xj is trivial, consisting of just a single value, so the
sufficient statistics for X1 and X2 are trivially condition-
ally independent and thus our derivation of the multi-
plicative pooling rule holds. Unsurprisingly, in this case
it just says that Debbie should continue to assign the uni-
form distribution. On the other hand, knowing both the
value of X1 and the value of X2 is enough to determine
Y uniquely, so Oswald’s posterior is a point measure and
there is no way that Debbie could determine it from the
data she has available. The reason why this happens is
that all the information about Y is contained in the corre-
lations between X1 and X2, i.e. P (Y = 0|X1 = X2) = 1
and P (Y = 0|X1 6= X2) = 0, and Oswald is the only
agent who has access to this data.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a Bayesian approach
to quantum state compatibility, improvement and pool-
ing, based on the principle that states should always be
updated by a quantum analog of Bayesian conditioning.
This improves upon previous approaches, which were
more ad hoc in nature. Due to our use of the conditional
states formalism, our results apply to a much wider range
of causal scenarios than previous approaches. Indeed, the
ability of this formalism to unify the description of many
distinct causal arrangements explains the otherwise puz-
zling fact that authors considering very different causal
arrangements have found the same results. For instance,
the compatibility criterion found by Brun, Finkelstein
and Mermin in the case of remote measurements [24] is
identical to the one found by Jacobs in the case of se-
quential measurements [28].
This paper only represents the beginning of a Bayesian
approach to these problems; there is a lot of scope for fur-
ther work. For example, it would be interesting to deter-
mine when a quantum linear pooling rule can be derived
from Bayesian principles, as it has been in the classical
case [55], and whether the results of previous method-
ologies for quantum state improvement and pooling can
be reconstructed from a Bayesian point of view. How-
ever, perhaps the most important lesson of this paper is
that the conditional states formalism can vastly simplify
the task of generalizing results from classical probabil-
ity to the quantum domain. Definitions, theorems and
proofs can often be ported almost mechanically from clas-
sical probability to quantum theory by making use of the
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appropriate analogies. Many aspects of quantum the-
ory that might appear, by the lights of the conventional
quantum formalism, to have no good classical analogue,
are seen under the new formalism to be generalizations of
very familiar features of Bayesian probability theory. As
such, this new formalism helps us to focus our attention
on those aspects of quantum theory that truly distinguish
it from classical probability theory, such as violations of
Bell inequalities, the impossibility of broadcasting, and
monogamy constraints on correlations.
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